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NOTICE TO READERS: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Berisha Reduces Obligatory Military Service

AU2403070895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's Press and Information Office reports that, based on a proposal by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the defense minister, the president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, today decreed an amendment to the Law on Military Service in the Armed Forces.

On the basis of this decree, which takes effect on 1 April 1995, the term of obligatory military service becomes 12 months instead of the current 15 months.

Zhulali, Hungarian Counterpart Sign Agreement

AU2403070695 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Mar 95

[Report by Elda Pino]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the talks held at the Defense Ministry yesterday, a protocol agreement was signed today on the results of talks between the two sides presided over by the Albanian and Hungarian defense ministers.

The protocol agreement assesses that relations between our two countries should advance in a multifarious way and in the spirit of friendship. Considering further possibilities of cooperation in the military field, the document signed by the defense ministers determines the directions and concrete tasks for various spheres, such as the exchange of delegations and military teams and the assistance that Hungary will provide for the Albanian Army in the fields of logistics, military health service, and education.

After signing the protocol agreement, the two defense ministers appraised the importance of this document and stressed the need for it to be implemented in practice. They also stated that cooperation in the military sphere between Albania and Hungary should be strengthened further.

The Hungarian ambassador in Tirana, Ferenc Poka, was also present when the protocol agreement was signed.

Meksi To Hold Talks While on London Trip

AU2303190395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Mar 95

[Statement by Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi at Rinas airport in Tirana on 22 March before departure for London—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Council of Ministers, Aleksander Meksi, left for London today. Before departure, Meksi made the following statement for television:

[Begin Meksi recording] This trip to England is on the occasion of a conference on a Rothschild Foundation presentation for the Butrinti Foundation on archaeological excavations, on the basis of an agreement that the Archaeological Institute of the Academy of Sciences has signed with the British School in Rome on further explorations that aim to develop tourism in the south of Albania in the Ksamil area, up to the banks of the Pavla River.

Apart from this, we will hold talks at the Foreign Office and conduct other meetings, in which we are primarily to discuss the situation in the region, the developments of democracy in Albania and, of course, the relations between Albania and England, which have started well. We will do our best to contribute to developing them further and managing to establish a British Embassy in Tirana, as well as signing various agreements on investments, double taxation, etc. [end recording]

Prime Minister Meksi was seen off by members of the government.

Cabinet To Increase Major Budget Section Funding

AU2303215495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government will ask the National Assembly to approve funding for the government's expenditure in April as well, at the rate of one-twelfth of last year's national budget. The 1995 budget bill will be submitted to the parliament before the end of March.

Following today's lengthy discussion of the draft budget in the cabinet, it has become known that the estimated budget deficit for 1995 is 42 billion leva, which is 15 billion leva more than the finance ministry's original calculation. The Bulgarian National Bank [BNB] considers that it should not be too hasty in reducing interest rates, as a result of which the previous amount needed to service the national debt is adjusted by 10 billion leva.

After three weeks of discussions, the cabinet agreed to slightly increase the funding under certain major sections of the budget. It is planned that education will receive 4.5 percent; health care, 4.12 percent; defense and security, 4.1 percent; and social insurance, 11.3 percent. These percentage calculations relate to an expected GDP of 800-850 billion leva, according to Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov's assessment.

At today's cabinet session, Deputy Prime Minister Konakchiev presented a report that marked the start of the procedure for preparing the government's four-year administrative program.

Dimitrov Rejects White Paper Charges

AU2403121395 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 22 Mar 94 p 13

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, former chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the SDS, by Tikhomir Sholev; place and date not given: "This Is a Farce"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sholev] Mr. Dimitrov, the White Book states that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] has failed as a ruling party. Do you agree with this assessment?

[Dimitrov] This is just what one expects from a communist government. This whole farce surrounding the White Paper will evidently continue.

[Sholev] Do you deny that when you were prime minister our USSR [as published] markets disintegrated and our exports of military products to Latin America and the Middle East collapsed?

[Dimitrov] I think Mr. Videnov is a bit late. In 1994 a long report was submitted to parliament on the plight of our military industry. Following much baying of hounds in the media, the report's authors were obliged to admit that the SDS government had taken no harmful actions. Accordingly, detailed explanations based on hindsight can hardly benefit anyone. Regarding the Russian markets, only one problem exists, namely the settlement of payments. In 1991 we faced an extremely critical situation. It turned out that no counterpayments were being made for Bulgarian exports to Russia. We were unable to collect a considerable amount of money, which in any event exceeded $250 million. Obtaining this money remains a problem even now.

[Sholev] Mr. Dimitrov, Videnov's document claims that our intelligence and counterintelligence services were ruined when you were in office. Is this true?

[Dimitrov] The Bulgarian intelligence service has a rather sad reputation. Much of its activities were dubious in an economic sense. During my government many people—such as Brigo Asparukhov [National Intelligence Service director] for example—were unable to give precise explanations of what had been going on before they took charge. There are people still in leading intelligence posts who are closely connected with the former Communist Party. They played their part in toppling the SDS government, or at any rate took part in the campaign to overthrow it. Videnov and his cabinet should stop to think about this matter.

[Sholev] Many people left the Interior Ministry when the SDS was in power. The White Paper also refers to this period when it discusses rising crime.

[Dimitrov] One cannot make a connection between rising crime and the numbers of people leaving or joining the Interior Ministry. The important thing is not how many left, but the type of staff that the Interior Ministry had and the kind of people who remained.

Party To Nominate Zhelev for Second Term

AU2303133695 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 21 Mar 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Broad Coalition To Nominate Dr. Zhelev for Second Term"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only a broad coalition of opposition forces could nominate Dr. Zhelev to serve a second term as president, Ventseslav Dimitrov, leader of the Democratic Center Party, said on 20 March. If such a coalition emerged, its members could rally around Dr. Zhelev's ideas. The president is a member of the Liberal International, while the Democratic Center Party professes Christian-democratic ideas, but this should not prevent the party from supporting Dr. Zhelev, because this is the nature of democracy in our country.

On 20 March, after their first congress in Gabrovo, representatives of the Democratic Center Party met with Dr. Zhelev. Ventseslav Dimitrov has requested the meeting because, according to him, the presidency is one of the few institutions in our country in which the Communists are not the dominating force. Dr. Zhelev has greeted the establishment of the Democratic Center Party. He told Ventseslav Dimitrov that political life is conducted through parties.

The Democratic Center Party addresses itself to business circles, the middle class, and the intelligentsia. It strives to form a coalition not only with the People's Union of Stefan Savov and Anastasiya Mozer, but also with other political forces, except the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. According to Ventseslav Dimitrov there is a vacuum in the rightist political space, because the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] opened that space for former communists.

The Democratic Center Party intends to seek contacts with the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, "New Choice" of Ludzhev and Pushkarov, the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], and Margarit Mitsev's monarchist organization. Persons such as Stoyan Ganev and Emil Koshlukov will have an important role in our country's political life, Ventseslav Dimitrov predicted. At present the Democratic Center Party intends to concentrate on the municipal elections.

New Party's Ability To Provide Opposition Doubted

AU2403090195 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 20 Mar 95 p 8

[Commentary by Georgi Asyov: "New Is Old"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The newly created Democratic Center Party (DCP) of National Assembly member Ventseslav Dimitrov held its first congress last weekend in Gabrovo.

The half-concealed goal of the DCP congress was to make the first miraculous step toward uniting the opposition, something that would turn it into an alternative to the discredited Union of Democratic Forces [SDS].

There can be no doubt that Bulgaria needs a strong opposition. However, it is more than doubtful that the DCP will be one of the "centers" of this opposition.

The trouble is not the well-known faces but the well-known habits of not forgetting anything old and not learning anything new. It was precisely the leadership ambitions and intolerance of people such as the main DCP leaders that pushed the Ecoglasnost Political Club and the Liberals into the hands of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], and it appears that now it is the turn of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party to do the same. If the DCP really wants to create a strong opposition, would it not be better to join the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union or the Democratic Party, to which Dimitrov actually owes his place in parliament?

In the meantime, in another part of the country—Bansko—the Club of Faithful Husbands has been established. I hope that I am wrong, but I think that this event will be remembered longer than the first congress of the nonexistent DCP Democratic Center Party.

Coalition Opposes Land Act Amendments in Rally

AU2403070395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In Sofia this afternoon, the People's Union coalition, consisting of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and the Democratic Party, held a protest rally and march against the amendments to the Land Act. At the rally in Aleksandur Nevski Square, members and supporters of the People's Union were joined by people taking part in the rally and march organized by the Union of Democratic Forces in defense of land ownership.

'Illegal' Organization Invites Canadians to Rally

AU2303202295 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 21 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Toni Maskruchka: "Canadians To Report on United Macedonian Organization and Its Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 March, it was reported that the illegal "Ilinden" United Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Organization has invited Canadian correspondents to the memorial rally it plans to hold at Yane Sandanski's grave on 22 April.

The Canadian guests will arrive a few days earlier in order to write a series of articles about the members of the Macedonian organization and the human rights violations in Bulgaria.

In the last five years, only personalities from Macedonia, Greece, and Germany have come for the banned rallies of the "Ilinden" United Macedonian Organization.

Contacts with the Canadians were facilitated by Skopje's NOVA MAKEDONIJA correspondents and Macedonian emigrants living overseas.

At the end of January, the illegal Macedonian organization sent a complaint to the International Court at The Hague in which it claimed that its members' human rights were being violated systematically in Pirin Macedonia.

Investigators are currently looking into the "Ilinden" United Macedonian Organization in connection with its illegal actions at the Rozhen Monastery and the Samuil Fortress since 1993.

The ritual at the Rozhen field on 22 April is expected to last 15 minutes in accordance with the preliminary script. In the next few days, the organization's leaders will submit an official request to the municipal authorities of Sandanski to hold the rally. They are hoping that the new Sandanski mayor will allow the rally.

Last year, 200 policemen guarded Yane Sandanski's grave and did not allow the "Ilinden" United Macedonian Organization members near the grave. The illegal organization's action had been prepared a month before the event, under conditions of total conspiracy.

The organization's extremist wing last year appealed to the UN Security Council to send an international force to Pirin and Aegean Macedonia to facilitate the establishment of a strong and united Macedonian state in the Balkans under UN control. The appeal was posted on walls throughout Petrich and Sandanski.

Ex-Communist Founds Party, Anti Joining NATO

LD2203224895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Miroslav Stepan, a former communist official, has founded the Party of Czechoslovak Communists [Strana ceskoslovenskych komunistov], which has already been registered by the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic. According to Stepan, the new party is critical of the current Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and opposes the entry of the Czech Republic into any military grouping, including NATO.

Deputy Defense Minister on Military Spending

AU2403090095 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 15 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by "kv": "The Czech Army Wants To Invest Kc120 Billion Over 10 Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Deputy Defense Minister Miloslav Kalousek said on 14 March that the Army of the Czech Republic plans to invest approximately 120 billion korunas [Kc] by 2005. Last year's investments totaled Kc1.7 billion—that is, not quite 7 percent of the Defense Ministry's expenditures; this year that amount should reach Kc5.5 billion, approximately 20 percent of the total expenditures.

He said further that the fundamental development projects launched this year will enable the Czech Army to gradually achieve compatibility with NATO systems. In the near future, the share of investment expenditures should reach approximately 30 percent of the military outlay (the remainder goes to the servicing, maintenance, repair, and operation of military equipment and machinery, and to wages and social and health care). This year's Defense Ministry budget is approximately the same as last year's—Kc27 billion.

Quarterly Magazine Launched

AU2403071295 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 18 Mar 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "A New Representative Army Magazine Has Been Prepared by the Impuls Editorial Office"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Czech Republic Army's [ACR] newly published representative quarterly has attracted a favorable response in NATO's Brussels headquarters. Major General Jiri Nekvasil, chief of the General Staff, initiated the establishment of the new periodical. Our Army is presented in it in all of the spheres in which it can currently take pride, especially abroad, on 32 high-quality format pages. The new quarterly is intended for the representatives of our missions abroad, ACR military and air attaches, and foreign attaches in our country. The magazine also presents our troops in the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] peace mission and during joint exercises with the armies of NATO member countries. The magazine is prepared by the Army's Impuls editorial office. It is published in Czech and English but is not yet on sale.

Treaty With Hungary Gives Boost Toward NATO

LD2303234395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The bilateral treaty between Slovakia and Hungary has unequivocally strengthened Slovakia's standing with regard to joining NATO. This step has been seen as very positive, but it has to be followed by the implementation of the treaty's principles, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk told TASR following his talks in Washington with Walter Slocombe, U.S. under secretary of defense. He also briefed the U.S. official about the preparations of other agreements with Hungary linked to the basic treaty. The talks between the two politicians also touched upon issues concerning the enlargement of NATO.

SNS's Slota Explains Objections

AU2303202495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Mar 95 pp 1, 5

[Interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by Rado Stevcik; place and date not given: "This Treaty Worries Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps the only Slovak politician who has expressed publicly his disappointment at the signing of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between Slovakia and Hungary is Jan Slota, chairman of the coalition Slovak National Party [SNS]. He was especially critical of the fact that the treaty contains Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation No. 1201 of 1993. We asked him to explain his stance in greater detail.

[Slota] This treaty would also be quite acceptable to us without the Council of Europe recommendation. I want to emphasize that the recommendation mostly negates the whole treaty. When the two prime ministers reached an agreement on 16 March, the very next morning work began on demolishing the dam at Nagymaros. Is this, symbolically speaking, an accommodating step? For God's sake Slovaks, let us not paint a rosy picture of something when, in reality, everything is black. Take the opinion expressed by my colleague Bugar about Recommendation No. 1201. Let me quote: "Prime Minister Meciar's statement that autonomy cannot even be mentioned is arousing anxiety. This is not true. There are elements of it in Recommendation No. 1201, not, admittedly, of territorial, but of local autonomy, increasing the powers of the self-administrations and the powers of the minorities in culture and education." That is, they are already viewing this as a fait accompli, and, believe me, the Hungarian side also views it this way. The fact that the Slovak prime minister and foreign minister immediately placed this into a kind of context with individual rights is another matter. I am very worried about this treaty because the Hungarians view it from one angle, while Prime Minister Meciar and Minister Schenk view it from another. Despite the signing of the treaty, the two sides are still in a confrontational situation. What was the point of it?

[Stevcik] Did you meet with the Slovak prime minister on the eve of the treaty's signing as had been announced?

[Slota] No.

[Stevcik] So, the prime minister signed the treaty without consulting his coalition partners?

[Slota] Of course, the foreign minister briefed us on it before going to Paris. He explained to us that Recommendation No. 1201, in essence, had only been put into the treaty on an individual level. I expressed my disagreement with this at that time, however.

[Stevcik] You pointed out on 19 March that the treaty will come into force only after it has been ratified by the parliaments of the two countries. Does this mean that the SNS will not be favorably inclined toward the treaty during its ratification?

[Slota] It would be premature to speak so unequivocally, because, as an individual, I do not have the right to say what kind of stance we will adopt on it. I have also consulted the Romanian side on their approach to this agreement; I held talks with the Romanian foreign minister and ambassador. This Council of Europe recommendation is unacceptable to Romania in any form, a position I sympathize with very much.

[Stevcik] You have said that you do not see the much-touted victory for the Slovak side in the signing of this treaty. Do you think there have to be victors and vanquished in the signing of such documents?

[Slota] Let us take 1939. The first state that recognized us was Hungary. Ten days later, it attacked us. Was that a victory, or what? We can also carry this over easily to 1995. I see it on the same level. It is enough to compare recommendation No. 1201 and the treaty and every literate person will see that this is no victory for us.

[Stevcik] Does the treaty threaten the governing coalition, will it bring about its collapse?

[Slota] There are more important issues here than this treaty. The existence of this republic is more important, as is ensuring that the pronationalist forces remain in political power. The SNS will proceed in this direction. In no way, however, would we want to lose face and the essence of the SNS's existence. We will express ourselves critically on the treaty, but within the series of all of the issues I have mentioned.

[Stevcik] Nevertheless, the loss of face exists here. Are you not afraid of accusations that the SNS is in a government that, through its prime minister, has signed a treaty with which your party disagrees?

[Slota] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia has the most members in the government; we have only two. Our members cannot overturn the opinion of the entire government. This probably makes sense. We will not alter the view that I expressed before the signing of the treaty. However, I want to emphasize that all Slovaks who support the SNS certainly understand our approach. If we were to cast doubt on the coalition, of course, we would create scope for the forces that are not sympathetic to us, our members, and our supporters.

[Stevcik] Prime Ministers Meciar and Horn are the men who initiated the way toward a historic conciliation between the two countries. How do you view the need for conciliation?

[Slota] Slovakia wants to have friendly relations with all of our neighbors. On the other hand, however, history confirms one thing: The Hungarians have never kept their word. Caution is needed. If we were not cautious, it would be a fundamental error. If only they keep their word. If they were to do this, all members of the SNS would be very happy. Personally, however, I have grave doubts about this. The statements concerning the implementation of Recommendation No. 1201 are already so different that the interpretations of the Slovak and Hungarian sides are almost diametrically opposed. Unfortunately, we have allowed ourselves to be mollified by an individual feature. Mr. Bugar has already said in your paper that this is a clause that does not mean anything to them.

[Stevcik] Will you meet with your coalition partners in the next few days to explain your stances?

[Slota] We will certainly meet. I was with the chairman of the Association of Workers on 18 March. We also discussed this issue. We expect to meet when the prime minister returns.

Comment From Press

AU2403072395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers of 18, 20, 21, and 22 March comment extensively on the agreement on the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, reached by the Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers, Vladimir Meciar and Gyula Horn, in Bratislava on 16 March, and on the signing of the text of the treaty in Paris on 19 March. While even the opposition press assesses the conclusion of the treaty as "truly a historic event" that "deserves appreciation," some commentators warn that certain provisions of the treaty allow various interpretations, that Meciar could use this foreign political success to "put things in order at home," and that the opposition of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to the treaty could destabilize the governing coalition.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 18 March on page 3 carries a 700-word Ivan Horsky commentary entitled "With the Interstate Treaty, Hungary and Slovakia Have Half-Opened the Door to NATO and EU." Horsky appreciates the fact that the two sides managed to "rid themselves of the burden of the past, which was not always marked by positive reminiscences. This is, undoubtedly, a good promise for the future, which both Budapest and Bratislava see in integration into the EU and NATO." By agreeing on the text of the treaty, Horsky continues, Bratislava and Budapest "issued themselves admission tickets to the civilized European states that do not settle mutual conflicts by the force of weapons but by means of discussion at the conference table." The commentator cautions, however, that the treaty "is only the first, though undeniably very significant, step on the long road that is somewhat euphemistically called Slovak-Hungarian settlement. Only the gradual implementation of the treaty and the translation of its spirit into everyday life will show whether the two countries have the internal strength to start a new chapter of cooperation, freed of unnecessary confrontational tones and suspicions, which is the foremost condition for membership of those two elite clubs."

In Horsky's opinion, "personal" motives also represented an "important factor" in the agreement between the two prime ministers: "Both governments, and particularly their chiefs as their dominant personalities, needed to demonstrate success also for personal reasons—both vis-a-vis the world and at home where domestic political problems, caused by the not exactly excellent economic situation, supply the opposition with political ammunition."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 18 March on page 1 carries a 400-word editorial by Marian Lesko entitled "Common Profit." Referring the two prime ministers' agreement on the treaty, Lesko writes that "the paradox that we observed for decades in erstwhile U.S.-Soviet relations is now being repeated at a different time and in a different form. American Democrats were winning elections with slogans about the need to reach agreement with the 'Russians,' but important agreements with the latter were always signed by advocates of much tougher positions, by Republican Presidents, who could negotiate without the fear of being accused of harming U.S. interests. In conformity with this logic, the basic treaty with Hungary was agreed upon by that Slovak politician who could afford it. But it should be added that Vladimir Meciar evidently wanted to reach agreement." In conclusion, Lesko qualifies the Slovak-Hungarian agreement as proof that "seeking common profit is usually rewarding in politics," and reminds Meciar that "this does not apply to foreign policy only."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 18 March on page 4 carries a 600-word commentary by Ondrej Dostal entitled "Shifted Focus." Dostal describes the treaty with Hungary as "the greatest success of present Slovak Government's foreign policy, which undoubtedly deserves appreciation." All the more so, Dostal adds, as "the composition of the Bratislava coalition" did not awaken such "positive expectations." He points out, however, that the Hungarian side had to show more "courage to compromise," because, unlike the Hungarian Government, the Slovak Government "need not fear that the majority of the opposition will oppose the treaty. Problems are to be expected only from a part of the Hungarian coalition and, in particular, from the nationalistic Slovak National Party (SNS), which does not pose a real threat to the prime minister."

Dostal concludes the commentary by saying: "With the conclusion of the basic treaty, focus of Slovak-Hungarian relations will now be shifted from the international to the domestic soil. While it is true that European institutions carefully monitor how the transforming states deal with questions concerning the status of minorities, they attach greater importance to relations between states. The present government coalition and, first and foremost, the prime minister now have two options. They can either try to apply the positive precedent from international practice to the domestic situation and start applying in domestic policy the path of flexibility, agreement, negotiations, and compromise, or they will perceive the calming down of the international public as an opportunity to put things in order at home in the spirit of election campaign rallies. The first option would mean progress in thinking, the latter only progress in the adroitness of methods used."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 20 March on page 7 carries a 700-word Ivan Horsky commentary entitled "Slovakia and Its Contribution to the Stability Pact." Commenting on the signing of the basic treaty in Paris, Horsky says: "As a result of certain external pressures, but also the vital interests of the two countries, Horn and Meciar's cabinets ultimately managed to excel themselves and to conclude a mutually acceptable compromise. The signed treaty gives Budapest and Bratislava the hallmark of Europeanness because they succeeded in overcoming in a civilized way the uneasy burden of their past and in laying the foundations for a new beginning in mutual relations, so badly needed in the near future. It can be said—and Bill Clinton suggested this in subtle diplomatic language in his letters to Gyula Horn and Vladimir Meciar last week—that the conclusion of the treaty is the two countries' calling card and essential prerequisite for any discussion on their admission as members of NATO and, from the West European viewpoint, EU."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 20 March on page 4 carries a 500-word Juraj Hrabko commentary entitled "Invention of One's Self-Destruction." The commentary, which assesses the first 100 days of Meciar's cabinet, describes the treaty as "truly a historic event" and "the greatest success of the first 100 days" of Meciar's term of office, "regardless of what led the Slovak prime minister to sign it, whether it was smugness or the calculation that unlimited political capital could be squeezed out of it, and regardless even of the fact that only a treaty that is observed is a real treaty."

On the same day, on page 15, SME carries an 800-word Martin Butora commentary entitled "Blank Check for the Bratislava 'Miracle'?" Speaking about the importance of the treaty for Slovakia, Butora says that, through the treaty, Slovakia is joining the "zone of security, stability, and peace in Europe" and that Slovak policy "has gained a clear profile as a policy of compromise and agreement, rather than as a policy of confrontation, as which it appeared ever since the memorable 'night of long knives' in parliament (reference to parliament meeting of 3-4 November 1994 at which the coalition occupied all key positions in parliament, public media, and the National Property Fund)." Another positive aspect, one "about which the present government coalition does not speak much at home," according to Butora, is the treaty's continuity with the foreign policy steps of "Dienstbier, Carnogursky, Moravcik, and President Kovac."

Butora warns, however, that "the Slovak-Hungarian agreement set off a process, the smooth course of which is not guaranteed. Slovak society as a whole is not ready for historic reconciliation, due largely to the governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and SNS. At the same time, at issue in Slovakia is not only settlement with Hungary but also, if not primarily, reconciliation with our own Hungarian ethnic minority. Changing these attitudes will not be easy: Who will replace the image of the enemy in the nationalistic media? And how will the Hungarian minority itself perceive the contents and impact of the treaty?

"The most serious concerns, however, are associated with the 'blank check' that Prime Minister Meciar allegedly gained because he proved himself as a politician of compromise. According to this interpretation, he will score so many points abroad for the 'Bratislava miracle' that his hands will be free for domestic excesses, starting with the expulsion of the Democratic Union from parliament and ending with the liquidation of the president and the pacification of the Constitutional Court."

Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 20 March on page 4 carries a 500-word Igor Stupnan commentary entitled "Slovak-Hungarian Compromise." Stupnan stresses that, more important than the treaty itself, will be its practical implementation. In this context he notes that "some passages, especially those on which political compromise was born with great difficulties, can very easily cause divergent interpretation. This would complicate the implementation of the basic treaty, which, in turn, would undermine the possibility of concluding a number of further bilateral agreements."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 21 March on page 3 carries a 700-word Jan Fule commentary entitled "Consensus Abroad Spells Strife At Home," which considers the impact of the treaty on the present government coalition. Fule says: "It has been demonstrated that Vladimir Meciar can be a politician when negotiating abroad. He has no problems accepting a compromise in the interest of reaching an agreement. This raises the question of why the same is so difficult for him on the domestic political scene. The answer is seemingly simple—Vladimir Meciar does not forget. If he is convinced that someone betrayed him, let him down, or disappointed him, he will remember this forever and hold it against him. The problem lies in the fact that, by now, the majority of the Slovak domestic political scene has found itself in the camp of traitors, enemies, or sources of disappointment. Precisely this circumstance could become fatal for Vladimir Meciar and the ruling coalition now that the treaty between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovak Republic has been signed. A revolutionary turn has occurred. Those whom the prime minister attacked so viciously in parliament welcome the signing of the treaty, while his coalition partners are either cautious or utterly opposed to the signing. At the first, possibly oversimplified, glance it could seem that the prime minister pushed through a treaty that satisfies the opposition, but not parts of the ruling coalition."

As Fule goes on to say, the treaty suits those who realize that Slovakia, but also Hungary, have no chance of joining the EU and NATO without it and those who do not wish tension with Hungary or with Slovakia's Hungarian minority. On the other hand, it cannot suit those who "live off" those tensions. The commentator considers it therefore possible that SNS deputies and "some" Hungarian deputies will join forces and will oppose the treaty's ratification in parliament.

Concluding, Fule says: "Vladimir Meciar's compromise, which is definitely his greatest foreign policy success thus far, may complicate as well as ease his situation at home. It will complicate the functioning of the coalition. But this fact is for the Slovak prime minister, to a certain extent, redemption. He is already well aware that he will not make his mark in the world with this government and, considering the qualifications of some of the ministers, not even at home. An internal political earthquake may therefore be expected following the treaty's signing. Everything that has been said about the government coalition and its staying in office for four years could be different as of last Sunday. Only one truth will be confirmed—the Hungarians are always to blame."

The impact of the Slovak-Hungarian compromise on the Slovak government coalition is also subject of a 500-word commentary by Peter Toth, entitled "Basic Treaty—Test of the Coalition," in Bratislava SME in Slovak on 21 March on page 4.

Toth opens the commentary by welcoming the treaty as "the first historic event of Europe-wide significance, in which Slovak Prime Minister Meciar has participated." He notes, however, that the quick signing of the treaty would not have been possible without the laws, passed under Meciar's predecessor Jozef Moravcik, allowing the use of bilingual signposts and the Hungarian version of female surnames. As Toth recalls, commenting on the passage of these laws in parliament, Meciar exclaimed "Shame on this government."

The commentator goes on to say: "In connection with the basic treaty, disconcerting political signals are coming directly from the camp of the Slovak Government coalition, specifically from the SNS. Leading SNS representatives consider its signing premature and refer to the possibility of cooperating with Romania." Toth considers the ideas about forging "some kind of an anti-Hungarian alliance" with Romania "dangerous and running counter to the political style of Western Europe, to which Slovakia wants to belong" and to be inconsistent with the government's own policy statement, which the SNS had endorsed. The commentator continues: "It is evident that the signing of the basic treaty has confirmed the emptiness of the program of Slota's SNS, whose existence in its current shape on the Slovak political scene has lost its meaning. The SNS is faced with the Hamletian question: To be or not to be? And the prime minister is faced with the question of what to do with such a coalition partner. This second question is all the more serious as the document that Vladimir Meciar signed in Paris is truly a European one, whereas the position of his coalition partner is more reminiscent of the period of the Cold War, although in a little turf form.

"The time of a two-faced policy—one for home use and one for the outside world—is coming to an end for the prime minister. For which of the two faces will he definitely opt?"

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 21 March on page 12 carries an 800-word Julius Loerincz commentary entitled "He Who Thinks Realis[illegible]ally." The commentator observes that issues on wh[illegible]e two sides were unable to agree—"such as question[illegible]oncerning the Danube and Hungarian recognition of the Slovak Republic as the legal successor to the former CSFR and CSSR"—"have remained open" and "have wisely been shelved." In spite of this, and in spite of "certain problems in the interpretation of the treaty, to which the Slovak Government drew attention in its statement of 19 March," Loerincz believes that Meciar and Horn signed a "good document that does not put anyone at advantage or disadvantage and that respects the national and state interests of both partners." While Loerincz agrees with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs in that "there exists no treaty that cannot be incorrectly interpreted and that cannot be violated," he thinks that "it will be better to pay heed to the advantages and merits of this treaty, which came about as a result of the political maturity of both negotiating parties and their ability to understand the requirements of stabilizing the Central European region and the needs of our nations and states in integrating Europe."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on 21 March on page 1, in its "Public Matter" editorial column, carries a 400-word commentary by Bronislava Jaglova. The commentator says: "The signing of the basic treaty with Hungary is the greatest political success of independent Slovakia thus far. By this act, Meciar has given a reply to those who before the elections (convinced of the support of their 'lobby' abroad) tried to frighten citizens into thinking that this prime minister would never receive support abroad. Meciar proved that his government is steadfastly taking the country to Europe." Responding to the treaty's critics, Jaglova says: "All those who misinterpret the treaty, and thereby undermine its significance, should realize that their attempts at destabilization are too evident and that hardly anyone will support them. The fact that, as early as on the day of signing the treaty, Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk had to sent a note to his Hungarian counterpart, Laszlo Kovacs, in response to the spreading of untruths about the treaty's contents only proves that it is not Slovaks who are hesitant to accept democratic compromises. However, our shield could be even cleaner if representatives of the Hungarian coalition, who are Slovak citizens, did not immediately start challenging and attacking the treaty. If they are afraid that the treaty will take the wind out of their sails, they have every reason to be afraid because the agreement between Budapest and Bratislava really limits the demands of minority leaders. But if they are afraid that we will not observe the treaty, their fear is unwarranted. As every advanced nation and democratic state, we will be guided by the treaty. That is why we have concluded it."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 22 March on page 4 carries an 800-word Robert Kotian commentary entitled "Target High Above the Average," which considers the discrepancy between Meciar's accommodating attitude toward his foreign partners and his domestic policies. "If Vladimir Meciar behaved toward Slovak Hungarian politicians as he does toward the Hungarian prime minister and if he listened to the domestic opposition as attentively as he does to the Russian prime minister, there might even be a Slovak-Slovak settlement," in addition to the Slovak-Hungarian one, Kotian observes. Kotian appreciates the signing of the treaty as a "statesmanlike step into Western Europe" but voices doubts about the "sincerity of Slovak Government efforts," in view of its members' previous rejection of the law on bilingual signs and the use of Hungarian female surnames and the government's negative attitude toward the Carpathian Euroregion. Kotian also says: "To confirm the tendency of moving toward civilized Europe, the government coalition would have to change a number of postelection steps, to make it possible to speak about harmony between domestic and foreign policy. It is not enough to differ from the extremist views of the coalition SNS, but the minimum for such harmony would to dissociate oneself from its statements. Otherwise, too many mines will remain on both the domestic and Hungarian fields, even after the adoption of the basic treaty, that can jeopardize the realization of the positive turn in Slovak-Hungarian relations."

Meciar Interviewed on Munich Visit, Paris Talks

LD2303214595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar ended his visit to Munich today and gave an interview for Slovak Television, Slovak Radio, and the Slovak Republic press agency. Journalists not only asked him about his working visit to Bavaria, but also expressed interest in his assessment of his official visit to France and talks he held with with political representatives of that country.

[Begin recording] [Meciar] [Passage omitted] As regards issues of multilateral cooperation, France has unequivocally declared its support for the Slovak Republic concerning all integration groupings and efforts, and it has unequivocally declared its interest in deepening a political dialogue. We have also declared our interest in deepening a political dialogue—namely, with the French Republic.

I expect that a number of important contacts will take place after the French elections. [Words indistinct] we established contacts in all quarters, without anticipating election results. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] Because we are in Munich, where the fate of our country was once decided, I would like to return to the Stability Pact conference held in Paris that you attended. Do you think this conference, as well as steps taken lately by Western politicians, have created chances to prevent something of this kind happening again, to prevent again being sacrificed by the West? Is there a chance for us to become part of the all-European security mechanism, without greater problems?

[Meciar] The Stability Pact was initiated in order to prevent any tension in Central Europe that might culminate in a conflict similar to that in Yugoslavia. Western countries fear such an option. This was the reason for looking for a modus vivendi, for ways of achieving conditions whereby the situation calms down.

Namely, in the period when tension was rising because of unrealistic and separatist demands by some representatives of the Hungarian minorities, be it in Slovakia or Romania, the Slovak Republic successfully handled this issue, reaching an agreement on the European standard of rights accepted by all and confirming it in the treaty. Thanks to this, the Slovak Republic gained political support and the acceptance of the existing level of rights in Slovakia. This does not involve a new extension by way of new rights, a creation of new standards, though they have never been published in such a condensed form as they are in this treaty.

The other important thing from the point of view of the Slovak Republic is that tension between the Slovak and Hungarian states is diminishing. We also have to take into account economic developments in the Hungarian Republic, which resulted in rather serious problems, with an impact in the social sphere as well. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Communique Issued on Kovac Talks With Slovak TV

LD2303231095 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A communique has been issued about the meeting between the Slovak president and the management of Slovak Television. The full text follows:

Slovak President Michal Kovac received Slovak Television officials today, led by its director, at their request.

They discussed the current situation brought about by petitions, rallies, and a campaign in the press aimed against Slovak Television for its alleged ban on the following programs: "Vecer Milana Markovica," "Halusky," and "A Propos TV."

Slovak Television officials briefed the president about the contract conditions concerning the above programs and about the fact that Slovak Television had met all of its obligations outlined in the broadcasting contract for "Vecer Milana Markovica" and had broadcast all parts as outlined by the contract.

The meeting showed that the attitude of Slovak Television with regard to complying with the contract could not be interpreted as a ban on these programs. Slovak Television management stated that it had been and continued to be prepared to hold talks with the creators and producers of these programs.

The Slovak president acknowledged with satisfaction the determination of Slovak Television to also create humorous and satirical programs of various types with other artists in order to give viewers a greater choice.

Minister Bisak Discusses Privatization

AU2403111395 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 14 Mar 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Privatization Minister Peter Bisak by Emilia Herzogova; place and date not given: "Privatization—One of the Strategic Objectives"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A change in ownership relations of such a magnitude as from the state to nonstate entities attracts considerable attention from the public. If we disregard the individual "classification" of changes from the state to communities, the settlement of restitution claims, laws on attenuation of some property-related wrongs, the so-called small-scale privatization, in which approximately 9,750 businesses changed owners, and other issues, the intentions of the large-scale privatization remain in focus. That is also the reason for today's interview with the minister for the administration and privatization of national property, Peter Bisak.

[Herzogova] Which characteristic of privatization do you find more fitting—the chance of the millennium or the "scam" of the century?

[Bisak] They are both extremes, so neither of them.... Now seriously, look, the scope of ownership changes that we implement cannot be compared with anything in either Slovakia or other postcommunist countries, which all have their own specific features. It is one of the strategic objectives of the government aimed at improving the economic basis. If we consider the volume of the property, we are also considering the amount of influence on the overall political and economic orientation of the state "outside" and on the domestic ground in the widest possible sense and in individual stages as well as on the whole.

[Herzogova] The demand for transparency and stricter control, even retrospectively, has been emphasized in connection with the Slovak Government policy statement. Is it a realistic proposition?

[Bisak] Transparency or tenebrosity is a matter of vantage point. It is no accident that the present government picked as one of its first priorities an inventory of the property designated for privatization.

[Herzogova] What is emphasized most?

[Bisak] As opposed to past stages, matter-of-factness and reassessment of strategically important enterprises are emphasized, and even the inevitable part of the property that is in the temporary use of the Slovak National Property Fund is being reassessed, of course, with respect to continuity.

Regarding control, it consists of systemic steps, with several control inputs also retrospectively.

[Herzogova] Can one obtain an "in-depth" view of what has been done, or....

[Bisak] Only the most important problem spheres will be assessed retrospectively—the ways of channeling funds, for instance, from the earnings of state enterprises to the "Ltd.s" connected with these enterprises; there are aspects of taxation to be considered, so it would not be an in-depth check on the entire process in all its scope but, rather, of certain focal points, where solving the problems can also mean drawing the management's attention to the use of "clean" working methods.

[Herzogova] Would you say that assessment should also be intensified in the enterprises "awaiting" the privatization decision?

[Bisak] I would not delimit it in this manner, although there have been attempts in some instances at generating funds "outside the enterprise." Moreover, a certain control should be just a matter of fact in a situation when, after November 1989, many departments ceased to exercise on this level their controlling duty as founders of numerous stockholding companies. The ordinary controlling aspects through the supervisory boards are usually ineffective.

[Herzogova] Who could even guess how much money we have lost on various speculative (also illegal) approaches? Could one put a price on it?

[Bisak] One could hazard a guess, but I do not believe it would have any practical significance except for the instances that are "ripe" for criminal proceeding. The position of the law and the observation of the rules and regulations are obvious.

Apropos the law, I must point out that Article 10 of the basic "92" of 1992 states that privatization decisions are not public, while other articles define the obligation to announce submission of a privatization project. There are also limits on making the entire process transparent, although, even from this point of view, one cannot satisfy everyone according to his or her expectations. At the ministry, the parliamentary commission for supervision of privatization has access to all documents and intentions as specified, and the results of the working and selection commissions will be published in regular releases for the press, so the information should improve.

[Herzogova] So you count on the media as an ally for greater transparency?

[Bisak] In a way, yes.

[Herzogova] At your ministry, you assess the projects from different points of view. Have some approaches or, rather, privatization withdrawals been "defined"?

[Bisak] A part of the concept just completed, which we are submitting for discussion in the Slovak Cabinet, includes also certain criteria—property, restitution, legal, economic, and other—according to which each project is to be assessed. We take care, together with the founding organization, of all of the decisions on privatization, except for those on direct sale (which is within the powers of the Slovak National Property Fund). Even the enterprises have already been picked that are not in the running for the second wave of privatization.

[Herzogova] Does this include the Postal Newspaper Delivery [PNS]....

[Bisak] It is a temporary solution "to postpone" the PNS. Nevertheless, we will return to the privatization plans for this organization. Other such examples are telecommunications, some engineering firms with special production, Slovak power plants, gas works, in farming—land and forests in state ownership, important sources of underground water, etc. This, against the wishes of our ministry, includes also the Slovak Danubian Shipping Line....

[Herzogova] What about the spas?

[Bisak] The thermal mineral springs remain in unchanged form, the spa facilities will be privatized.

[Herzogova] Let us return to the unpleasant custom of a government's privatization projects being canceled by the next government. It was done by Moravcik's cabinet as well as by the present one. Could this be avoided?

[Bisak] The decisions on privatization were issued by government resolution, and a government resolution can quash them. It is a step to which every government has the right, and each has made use of it. Nevertheless, I emphasized already that in the instances where the purchase contract had been signed, this step cannot be abrogated. This concerns five projects, and it is only up to the parties involved to jointly reassess the conditions. The sale of the Novaky Chemical Works to Inekon is a good example. The representatives of both contractual parties are holding talks with the representatives of the Slovak National Property Fund regarding a change in the conditions of sale or fine-tuning certain demands.

[Herzogova] It is not easy for privatization to resist pressures from political parties. Is it at all possible to depoliticize this process?

[Bisak] I am at the head of the department as a sympathizer of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, and am convinced that, if all interested parties are willing, even in this respect a "more moderate level" can be reached.

[Herzogova] Although the government has 100 days before the first assessment, could you recapitulate this period in your department a little in advance?

[Bisak] Let us rather leave it until the 100 days are over. They are necessary for an objective evaluation of the fulfilled intentions and expectations. I favor a fast but never breakneck privatization wherever the matters are, one could say, clear from all points of view and stands, but also caution even in details, if they are complicated.... Otherwise, and this is understandable, I identify with the adopted philosophy regarding the methods and procedures for the continuation of the large-scale privatization, including the second wave of the coupon method, the preliminary round of which should begin, according to the accepted reassessed concept, on 1 July 1995.

The combination of nonstandard and standard methods in the future process will signify, I believe, only a beneficial expansion of the strategic objective, which privatization is, also for the present government.

Kozyrev's Budapest Talks Focus on OSCE Affairs

LD2403115895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] At their meeting in Budapest, the Hungarian and Russian foreign ministers have discussed, among other issues, the Chechen crisis. Before the meeting, Andrey Kozyrev said that he wanted to have talks with Laszlo Kovacs in the latter's capacity as president of the all-European security organization [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE]. Istvan Kulcsar reports on the talks.

[Kulcsar] Andrey Kozyrev arrived in Budapest from Geneva for a working visit of a few hours. [passage omitted] In the Hungarian capital, first he met his host Laszlo Kovacs. The two foreign ministers started their negotiations behind closed doors in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry building at 1115 hours [1015 GMT]. Their associates joined them 20 minutes later.

Kozyrev is visiting Kovacs in the latter's capacity of OSCE president. Accordingly, as the Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesman told me, bilateral relations will not be discussed. OSCE affairs will be the main topic of the talks, especially the role that the OSCE can play in the settlement of the Chechen crisis. By the same token, the Yugoslav region will also be discussed, and the expansion of NATO will surely be touched on. In fact, that issue played an important part in the discussions between Andrey Kozyrev and Warren Christopher in Geneva.

Kovacs, Somogyi on Slovak Note on Basic Treaty

AU2303202695 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 23 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs and Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi by Zoltan Udvardy; place and date not given: "Laszlo Kovacs on the Slovak Note and the Reply—It Should Be Implemented, Not Interpreted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Udvardy] Mr. Kovacs, what position have you formulated in connection with the Slovak interpretation of the basic treaty?

[Kovacs] I find it unfortunate that the Slovak side has been trying to interpret the basic treaty since its signing. I am convinced that treaties should not be interpreted; instead, their content should be implemented. The treaty and the international documents included in this treaty, including Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, contain precise formulations, so there is no need to interpret the treaty, and there is no way of reinterpreting the text. Besides, there is no legal validity to unilateral treaty interpretations. Any side can do that, but this has no effect whatsoever on the other side or on the validity of the treaty.

[Udvardy] What countermeasures can we expect from the Hungarian side regarding the Slovak note?

[Kovacs] The Foreign Ministry will naturally answer the Slovak Government note and, in addition to expressing our opinion, we will also propose to refrain from conducting interpretation debates because, on the one hand, this is useless and, on the other hand, this could harm the evaluation of our two countries. This could harm the favorable reaction we have achieved through the signing of this treaty.

[Udvardy] Will the Hungarian Government continue to support the autonomy efforts of the organized ethnic Hungarian minorities, or are there some criteria for this?

[Kovacs] In this matter too, the basic treaty has created a clear situation, because it refers to two international documents in which the word "autonomous" appears as a marking word as a legal obligation. One of these is the OSCE document issued in Copenhagen that mentions the possibility of creating "local or autonomous administration" for national minorities in its Article No. 35; the other, Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe according to which, in places where they form a majority, the ethnic minorities "have the right to have adequate local or autonomous authorities." With reference to the signed treaty, the Hungarian Government naturally supports the relevant efforts.

[Somogyi] We adequately present the Hungarian position the essence of which is that we regard the formulation written in the treaty as the basis of interpretation, a formulation that is fully in harmony with the content of the Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe. Given the fact that the Slovak side presented a note, the Hungarian side is preparing a similar reaction. Any interpretation that provides inexact quotation of this formulation gives rise to misunderstandings.

Assessment of Minorities

AU2303170395 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 22 Mar 95 p 2

[Correspondent's report: "The Treaty Is Good, the Minorities Say"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of the Slovak national minority in Hungary were involved in formulating the basic treaty, and they met several times with Csaba Tabajdi, the political state secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister. We learned all this from Mihaly Mata, executive chairman of the Federation of Slovaks in Hungary. At the same time, Mata complained that they did not have the opportunity to read the individual drafts and that they received the final text only later, after the representatives of the Hungarian parties abroad. "Nothing is mentioned about the 120,000 Slovaks living in Hungary, as if no one was interested in our opinion," Mata said.

The government of the mother country did not consult with the Slovaks living in Hungary because, in its view, the treatment of national minorities is the internal affair of every country. Therefore, neither did they support the Slovaks in Hungary. In Mata's view, however, thanks to the basic treaty, the situation might be better in the future.

In Romania's view, "basic treaties are signed between governments" so the national minorities cannot interfere in formulating the text. Hungary, however, finds it natural to involve the relevant people—Gyorgy Petrusan, chairman of the Federation of Romanians in Hungary, told NEPSZAVA.

The ethnic Romanians here spoke only with the Hungarian Government, and not with the mother country's government, Petrusan said, and added that their requests have been taken into consideration and included in the Hungarian side's draft. In his view, this draft is the maximum that can be achieved today.

Gyorgy Petrusan added that the Hungarian Government is conducting a correct and minority-friendly policy but the lack of funds causes problems.

Construction of Nuclear Storage Facility Begins

LD2303164195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The construction of temporary storage for spent nuclear fuel rods has started in Paks. The search for the final location of a nuclear waste storage facility still continues. Laszlo Szepesi reports.

[Szepesi] A train loaded with nuclear waste left Paks [for Russia] a few weeks ago, and another trainload of spent nuclear fuel rods will soon be directed to Russian reproduction factories. In spite of this fact, a provisional storage facility will be built near the reactors, to ensure the power station's long-term operation. Spent fuel rods from Paks—exclusively from Paks—can be stored for 50 years here, if necessary, without the slightest pollution of the environment.

The construction of this storage facility started this morning. Following a lengthy and extensive procedure for authorization, VEGYEPSZER, the company that won the bid, has finally moved into the work area and construction can now start.

The first module of the temporary storage will be ready by autumn of next year. Experts are not working only on the storage of spent fuel rods. A conference to find final storage for Paks's wastes, of small and medium level radioactivity, started in Szekszard this morning. Mayors of towns and villages that according to the Hungarian State Institute of Geology have proved to be suitable for further research to accommodate the final storage have also been invited to this meeting.

Daily Profiles Likely Presidential Candidates

WS2303140095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Long List of Candidates for Belweder Office; One of 20"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The presidential campaign is already under way despite the fact that only a few political groups have actually announced the names of their candidates. According to our calculations, right now there are more than 20 people who will want to (or have to) run for president. Before they decide to run, the candidates must collect 100,000 signatures on petitions in support of them—this will be the first verification.*

Lech Walesa's term in office expires on 23 December. The earliest possible date for elections is 22 October. The election date is announced by the Sejm speaker—four, or three months before the elections at the latest.

Wlodzimierz Bojarski

The committee that supports the candidacy of Professor Wlodzimierz Bojarski was set up on 25 February 1995. "This is our own initiative; the professor has not made up his mind yet," RZECZPOSPOLITA learned from the committee's representative Jozef Tallat. Wlodzimierz Bojarski was one of the founders of the Center Accord [PC], and then he was its member, senator of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club in the first-term Senate; he is the author of a recently published book entitled WIECEJ POLSKI [MORE POLAND]. It is not known, however, whether he will agree to run in the elections—recently he has been one of the guests at a meeting of another candidate, Adam Strzembosz, with students at the University of Warsaw.

Janusz Bryczkowski

Starting in 1988 he was the leader of the Polish Green Party [PPZ], on the ticket of which he wanted to run for president in the 1990 elections. However, he failed to collect the required 100,000 signatures. He was expelled from PPZ, following which he began cooperating with Andrzej Lepper of "Self-Defense." He was also the leader of the "Self-Defense Alliances." He caused a split in Self-Defense, and finally set up the National Self-Defense Front, at the invitation of which Vladimir Zhirinovskiy visited Poland. It was as early as August last year that he informed the public that he was going to run for president; he emphasized that he evaluated his chances as "not any worse from Walesa's chances." He officially began his campaign on 1 September 1994.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz

He is listed as one of the three candidates of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] for president; however, it is not very likely that he will win the party's nomination. He might get it if SLD made some kind of a political deal with the Belweder, for instance, and decided to field a candidate with a poor chance of advancing to the second round of elections. His "clean hands" campaign, waged at the time when he was deputy prime minister and justice minister in the Pawlak cabinet, was looked upon as the beginning of his presidential campaign. The incumbent deputy Sejm speaker received 3 percent of the vote in a presidential poll conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] in March.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke

The campaign committee of the chairman of the Union for Real Politics [UPR] has been set up with his consent by his party colleagues, led by Lech Pruchno-Wroblewski. Korwin-Mikke has declared, however, that if in the last phase of the elections it turns out that there is another candidate of the united right wing who stands a better chance of success, he will bow out and support that candidate. Before the presidential campaign in 1990, the UPR chairman failed to collect the required number of signatures.

Marian Krzaklewski

The candidacy of the chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" ["S"] has been submitted by leaders of the Secretariat of Center Right Groupings [SUC]. Krzaklewski thanked them for their confidence in him, but declined to run. Members of the center right are still hoping, however, that at the last moment the "S" leader will be persuaded and will run in the elections as a candidate for all anticommunists in Poland. However, today Marian Krzaklewski could not even count on full support from "S"—many unionists would more readily vote for Walesa, for instance.

Jacek Kuron

He is the most serious presidential candidate from the Freedom Union [UW]. He won the union's primaries that were to select the "candidate for candidate." He was backed by 47 percent of UW's members. He received more votes than the three other people who applied for the nomination: Hanna Suchocka, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, and Adam Strzembosz. He is supported by the left wing of UW. Recently he has been officially supported by UW Parliamentary Club Chairman Bronislaw Geremek; the liberal wing, as well as party Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki are against his candidacy. It cannot be ruled out that the Union of Labor [UP] will also decide to endorse Kuron. There appeared rumors during the time of political contacts with SLD that Kuron might be supported by this party. Kuron stated that this would mean "a kiss of death" to him, which put an end to all speculations on this subject. In the March pole, he was supported by 13 percent of prospective voters (according to CBOS). For many months now he has been the most popular politician.

Aleksander Kwasniewski

He is potentially the strongest candidate for president. For months he has been at the top of all presidential rankings. In March, 19 percent of respondents declared their support for him. He is also the most serious candidate in SLD, especially now that the idea of fielding a common candidate with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is becoming increasingly less realistic and Jacek Kuron has rejected the possibility of making a political deal. At the recent convention of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] in Poznan it was decided that the SLD leader should be the person representing the left in the presidential elections. Thus, the presidential campaign within the party was started.

Wojciech Laczkowski

The candidacy of Wojciech Laczkowski, judge on the Constitutional Tribunal and chairman of the State Electoral Commission, has for some time now been endorsed by several leaders of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], who believe that Adam Strzembosz is "not Catholic enough." Laczkowski himself has not voiced his opinion yet. It is known, however, that if ZChN fails to win other rightist groupings over to this candidacy, it will not be considered serious even in Ryszard Czarnecki's party [ZChN].

Leszek Moczulski

"Unless there appears a candidate of a broad anticommunist bloc, whom we would be able to endorse, we will encourage Chairman Leszek Moczulski to run in the elections," say politicians of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]. Moczulski ran in the previous presidential elections—he came in last. Right now 3 percent of voters are willing to support him. For the time being KPN is holding intensive talks with other parties; it does not rule out the possibility of fielding one candidate along with some rightist parties, nor does it exclude the possibility of backing Lech Walesa.

Kornel Morawiecki

He is a candidate of the insignificant, radically anticommunist Freedom Party, on whose support he can count. This grouping was formed in Wroclaw on the foundations of the underground "Fighting Solidarity." In 1990 Morawiecki submitted his candidacy in the presidential elections, but failed to collect the required number of signatures.

Andrzej Olechowski

The former finance minister and minister of foreign affairs has recently retreated from the limelight of ongoing political events. As he once stressed, in politics there must be certain principles of loyalty; therefore, he could not run in the elections against Lech Walesa. If, however, the incumbent president evaluated that he himself does not stand a chance of success and encouraged Olechowski to run for the Belweder, the former head of the Foreign Ministry might count on both Walesa's and his own supporters. As for the latter, there are 8 percent of them now (in line with CBOS research).

Jozef Oleksy

The incumbent prime minister has not entirely given up the idea of running in the presidential elections. Until recently he was considered the only politician who would be able to obtain the support of PSL and become the coalition's joint candidate for president. Now that the cabinet has changed it is not very likely that PSL will decide on this concept. In the March survery, 4 percent of Poles would vote for him.

Jan Olszewski

The former prime minister and honorary chairman of one of the Movements for the Republic said he was willing to run in the primaries, which, in line with the proposal put forward by Zbigniew Romaszewski, would be organized by "S." However, the National Commission of the union refused to hold them. Olszewski is already waging an informal election campaign—he is traveling all over the country and meeting with potential voters in towns and cities. It seems that the former prime minister is supported by GAZETA POLSKA, whose editor in chief is Piotr Wierzbicki. Olszewski is counting on voters from the center right and "S." Today he is supported by 2 percent of Poles.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz

The former national defense minister in the Suchocka cabinet took third place in the "candidate for candidate" primaries. He was supported by 16 percent of UW members (even though he himself is not a member of the party). His supporters in the party are people who, where platform is concerned, are very close to the supporters of the candidacy of Hanna Suchocka. In presidential polls conducted by CBOS he occupies last place, with 1 percent of the vote.

Waldemar Pawlak

The former prime minister is right now practically the only candidate of PSL for president—if the party decides to field its own candidate, not a joint candidate with SLD, and fight to advance to the second round. Now that his cabinet has been forced to step down, the chances of the PSL leader to achieve this are much smaller. In March Pawlak would be supported by 3 percent of respondents to the CBOS poll.

Adam Struzik

The Senate speaker is listed as the third possible candidate of PSL. The party may field him if it decides that supporting the candidacy of Pawlak would mean a very risky test of popularity for both Pawlak and the party. If PSL fielded Struzik, it would mean that the party would like to merely run in the elections, but not put up any real fight.

Adam Strzembosz

The first president of the Supreme Court has so far been the most talked about candidate of the right wing. He has not made an official decision yet, even though politicians of the right wing say that it will be made in March. Strzembosz is today supported by PC, the Conservative Party, Conservative Coalition, Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord, and the Peasant-Christian Party. Right now their candidate stands a chance of being supported by 4 percent of the voters.

Hanna Suchocka

After the UW primaries, she occupies second place as a "candidate for candidate," with 20 percent of the votes of UW members. The former prime minister is supported by the left wing of UW and by the party's leader, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In the March poll, 4 percent of CBOS research respondents declared support for her.

Boleslaw Tejkowski

The chairman and cofounder of the Polish National Commonwealth-Polish National Party and the leader of the Slavic Council (an organization consisting of nationalists of Slavic countries) informed a few months ago that he would run for the presidency. A little later on he was sentenced to a year in prison, suspended for two years, for "reviling, humiliating, and deriding the supreme authorities of the Polish Republic, people of Jewish origin, the Pope and the Episcopate, as well as for inciting nationalistic strife."

Lech Walesa

President Lech Walesa declared a long time ago that he would run for reelection. However, recently he suggested that if "democracy develops in the right direction," he will have nothing to do and so he will not have to run. Lech Walesa wants to appeal to the anticommunist electorate, stemming from "S." However, so far he has failed to attract serious rightist groupings. Walesa can count on the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, and perhaps on Religa's Republicans. If, under some pretext, he dissolved the parliament before the presidential elections, he might also be supported by some of the rightist groupings (such as ZChN, SUC, Party of Christian Democrats). Today, with 13-percent support, Walesa occupies third place in the presidential rankings.

Tadeusz Zielinski

Not long ago the spokesman for civil rights swore that the office he was holding now is the crowning glory of his career; today he no longer protests the proposal of UP's fielding him in the presidential elections. Even though Zielinski withdrew from the primaries in UW, he still does not rule out that there is such a need, he will not refuse to assume the office of the president. The spokesman might count on the support of the leftist electorate, such as UW and UP; he would also certainly take some votes away from a candidate of SLD. In March, 16 percent of CBOS respondents wanted to vote for him.

Jozef Zych

Until recently he was the most serious candidate of PSL for president—a candidate slightly against his will. At least several voivodship organizations of the party endorse him in their official stands. After being elected Sejm speaker, he suggests quite unambiguously that he does not intend to run for president.

In the CBOS study, he received 1 percent of the vote.

Candidates in the Spring

The list presented above is, of course, incomplete. Many candidates are bound to withdraw, new people may appear. It is expected that the candidacy of Adam Strzembosz will be submitted as soon as next week. UW will elect its candidate for president at the party's congress on 1-2 April. In May the PSL electoral convention will be held, and SdRP will choose its candidate for president only in June. According to Jan Parys of SUC, it will be sufficient if their candidate is submitted no sooner than July.

Privatization Law To Be Presented 28 Mar

LD2403120895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1125 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 24 Mar—The Privatization Ministry will on 28 March present to the government a draft law on reprivatization and draft amendments to the low on the privatization of state enterprises, Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek announced today at a press conference devoted to privatization plans for 1995.

The ministry is going to suggest that the amendments to the privatization law are dealt with urgently. According to the draft, employees of privatized enterprises would be given a free portfolio of shares (up to 15 percent). The amendments would make possible the allocation of free shares to employees of enterprises that will be privatized in the form of quick sale or by bringing capital to a company.

The draft law on reprivatization provides for compensation due to loss of property unlawfully taken over between 1944 and 1962.

Kolodko Recommends Wage Monitoring in State Firms

WS2403122095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Antoni Kowalik: "Limiting Profit Bonuses; Monitoring Instead of Corporate Tax on Above-Normative Wage Increases"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The distribution of last year's profits in state-owned companies and partnerships will not yield much for employees—they will be allowed to receive no more than the equivalent of one average salary, or, in well-justified cases, no more than the equivalent of one salary and a half. This is what Deputy Prime Minister [and Finance Minister] Grzegorz Kolodko recommended in a letter sent to ministers and voivodes. They, in turn, forwarded this recommendation to economic entities which they supervise.

Even though this year the corporate tax on above-normative wage increases [popiwek]—a means of punishing enterprises for excessive wage increases—is no longer operative, wages will continue to be controlled. This has been ordered by Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko in a letter to ministers and voivodes. Companies will soon start paying out profit bonuses to their employees. Directors of companies, agencies, and banks have received from their founding organs letters which remind them that on 1 January of this year the government abandoned the "method of influencing wage increases, in the form of a tax," used in previous years. It was pointed out in the letters that excessive wage increases were punished by a tax, which was later called popiwek. Right now punishment will be administered directly to directors and boards. The previous regulations were replaced by last year's law on a negotiation-based system of determining the increase in average wages in economic entities and on amending some laws.

In line with the deputy prime minister's recommendations, wage increases are to be monitored in all state-owned companies and partnerships where most of the capital is owned by the State Treasury. Incorrect practices determined as a result of an analysis of the wage increase formation will provide a basis to administer punishment to those who are responsible. The legal basis for such action will be Article 8 of the aforementioned law, as well as the Commercial Code, reads the letter to directors subordinated to the minister of industry and trade.

The letter from the deputy prime minister draws attention to the need for a "rational distribution of the 1994 profits, the purpose of which is to prevent limiting the possibilities of development in 1995 and in the following years; such a limitation might occur if large amounts of money in the work force's fund were earmarked for awards. While distributing 1994 profits, it is necessary to limit the size of awards for the work force to 8.5 percent of the average salary in a given economic entity, and in well-justified cases—to 12.5 percent."

This means that, just as was the case in the 1980's, employees can receive one salary (at that time it was called the 13th salary). It was possible to pay just as much when popiwek was in force.

The recommendation does not specify in exactly what cases it is justified to pay at the one-and-one-half salary level.

Commentary: PRL Revisited

WS2403121995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Mar 95 p 5

[Commentary by Bozena Wawrzewska: "PRL Returns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko issued a recommendation to limit profit bonuses in state-owned companies to the equivalent of one salary. The legal grounds for this action are unknown. What is known, however, is what will happen if the recommendation is disregarded: Sanctions will be applied to company directors and boards. Thus, we are again in a situation in which directives that come from the top, no matter whether there is a legal basis for such action or not, determine the amount of money that employees of companies are to receive. It does not matter whether the companies are good or bad—this criterion is immaterial.

Two says ago the industry minister presented his initial concept for consolidating hard coal mines. Mines that achieve poor economic results will not go bankrupt; they will be maintained by stronger mines. However, all of them, including the maintaining administrative apparatus, will most probably be financed by taxpayers, just as was the case in the old days.

A few days ago the government made a decision on obligatory establishment of holdings in sugar plants. There was a time when such holdings had a more Polish-sounding name: unions. Since it was conceived, this idea has over just a couple of months caused the prices of sugar to go up by 100 percent. This is probably not the last price increase—after all, the entire administrative apparatus of the obligatory holdings will have to be maintained.

Two weeks ago or so Prime Minister Oleksy announced that there would be no return to the Polish People's Republic [PRL]. There does not have to be. In some spheres, the PRL has already returned.

CBP Reports 'Considerable' Economic Recovery

LD2303212495 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 23 Mar 95

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Central Planning Office [CBP], the first two months of 1995 brought considerable economic recovery. In comparison with last year, industrial production increased by over 15 percent. We worked more productively, by over 14 percent, and there were 4 percent fewer unemployed. If this tendency were to maintain itself to the end of the year, then, in the view of CBP experts, this could signify a higher than assumed 6-percent economic growth.

[Begin Tadeusz Chroscicki recording, director of the Information and Prognoses Department of the CBP] I would associate this high economic growth with both high export opportunities and a simultaneous high increase in internal consumption, associated with both investment activity and the need for consumption articles. [end recording]

The fact that production enterprises and those providing services can sell ever more means that ever more jobs are being created. It is thus possible that, by the end of the year, only 14 percent of Poles will be without work, as was assumed in the state budget. In February we earned on average 634.30 new zloties. Real net wages thus fell in enterprises in comparison with January by over 1 percent. If, however, we compare remuneration in January and February this year with last year, it has increased by over 3.5 percent after taking inflation into account. Over the first two months of this year, the average retirement pension came to 393 zloties. This is almost 7 percent more in real terms than a year ago. However, the good economic situation is not without threats. The CBP envisages that the greatest dangers for the economy and for citizens are still to be found in high inflation because, in January and February, prices have already increased by over 6 percent.

[Begin Chroscicki recording] Inflation this year may reach a level of 18-19 percent more than in December of last year. This will be associated with expenditures such as increases in the official prices of fuels, energy, gas, and medicines. All of this will influence the increase of prices. [end recording]

A cause for concern is also the budget situation, difficult to assess in the CBP's view. In the view of Director Chroscicki, it is not clear whether it will be possible to collect the requisite level of taxes and duties because the "gray area" is growing—that is, illegal employment and trade. A calm picture is also disturbed by the fact that, for several years now, we have been building ever fewer houses. This year, during the course of January and February, almost 28 percent fewer homes were handed over than a year ago.

Belweder Criticizes State Environmental Policy

WS2303133795 Poznan WPROST in Polish 26 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Professor Stefan Kozlowski, chairman of the Ecological Council of the President of the Republic of Poland: "The Strategy of Ecoplunder"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite remaining far behind in terms of the organization and effectiveness of environmental protection, for a short while Poland was a leader among the postcommunist states. Today, that success is being forgotten, there is a growing trend of dissolving environmental protection organizations, and, most important of all, there is a tendency to underestimate the need to take strong actions in favor of the environment.

First of all, the Office of the Council of Ministers came to the conclusion that it was useless to pass a resolution on unforeseen dangers to the natural environment. The document was to define who is responsible for coordinating operations in the case of a huge chemical or nuclear plant disaster, or great fires or floods. The existence of several competitive early warning and rescue units was considered completely natural, when in practice it means unnecessary procedural red tape that delays launching operations which they need to be started as soon as possible.

The council of voivodes then announced a plan to dissolve the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate [PIOS], which was called to life by a Sejm resolution and worked on such projects as the monitoring of the natural environment and developing an effective system of announcing smog alerts in major cities. Similar institutions function in West Europe and the Czech Republic. PIOS also monitors the effectiveness of proenvironmental actions undertaken by the voivodes. The latter are demanding that the operations of PIOS be suspended and the old system of subordinating the monitoring services to the voivodes, that is subordinating the ones in control to those controlled, be restored.

We are drifting further away from European standards of environmental protection. Central ministries for monitoring and preventing natural calamities exist in all countries—they are particularly well developed in Italy, France, and Germany. They have a growing influence on the activities of the government. The German Ministry of the Environment plays a leading role in shaping government policies and solving complex social and economic problems (the safety of energy plants, floods, deforestation, water management, etc.). The natural environment council of European ministers is currently working on the provisions of a joint European environmental protection program. The European Environmental Agency was recently established within the EU.

All this was overlooked by the author of the "Strategy for Poland" [Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko], who transformed a vision of this country's development into a strategy—the tactics of a finance minister whose only problems pertain to the budget. Professor Kolodko is suggesting, for example, a reform of the economic center which provides for the dissolution of the ministry responsible for environmental protection. The principle that the management of natural resources should be separated from the economic ministries is questioned. If, for instance, the Ministry of Industry is to be responsible for geology, coal mining holdings will regain their privileged position. The threat might then arise that the raw materials and land policies will be subordinated to their interests. The forest industry is to be administered by officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, as was the case before 1989. In line with the overall philosophy, lumberjacks have probably already begun to undermine environmental protection projects, particularly in national parks such as Bialowieza.

The process of dismantling the state's environmental policy, adopted by the Sejm in 1991, has begun. We are going back to times when environment protection issues were disregarded, to the thoughtless destruction of natural resources and degradation of the quality of life in numerous regions, which we still remember from the not-so-distant past. Disregard for the laws of the natural environment always leads to its degradation and, as a result, to the worsening of living conditions for people.

Army Control of Illicit Air Traffic Viewed

WS2303151595 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 22 Mar 95 pp 1, 8

[Report by Eugeniusz Mleczak: "The Armed Forces and Winged Smugglers"]-

[FBIS Translated Text] *Last year and the beginning of the current one saw a growing number of airspace violations by small aircraft along Poland's northeastern border. We had 17 such incidents in 1994, and they have intensified with time. By the end of this February, eight such incidents had already been reported, sometimes two in the same day. Contraband is transported on propeller aircraft with illegible identification marks, flying at very low altitudes. The fact that the flight paths and the times of day these flights take place are similar indicates that this is an organized activity. The pilots are superbly skilled experts. Several domestically produced aircraft have also been detected.*

The media plainly point out that the Air Force and Home Air Defense Troops [WLiOP] are responsible for reacting to violations of our eastern border, and overlook other authorities responsible for the protection of our borders. It is worth taking a longer look when discussing the issue.

WLiOP is a branch of the Armed Forces that is supposed to prevent air reconnaissance and attacks, and to provide air support for land forces and the Navy. The objectives of these formations include the detection and destruction of means of air attack, the protection of key administrative centers, and providing air cover for Army formations and convoys, as well as naval bases. In times of peace, WLiOP remains on regular alert duty and implements objectives pertaining to the functioning of the air search-and-rescue system.

This is especially worth mentioning since attributing sole responsibility to WLiOP for stemming the smuggling by air of people and cargo in the border regions stems from ignorance. All craft flying at an altitude of up to 600 meters are free to fly over the territory of Poland, in the sense that to make a legal flight they must only notify the proper territorial air traffic control unit. In wealthier Western states, due to the greater number of flights by private planes and helicopters, that limit was raised to flights up to an altitude of 1,700 meters. This means that the lowest zone of air traffic control in Poland is practically in the hands of civilian air traffic control units.

A separate issue is the problem of detecting small craft flying at low altitudes. Despite the fact that there is a permanent "alert radiolocation field" over Poland allowing to detect aircraft flying over the country and in the vicinity of its borders, as well as to control and direct air traffic above Poland, some aircraft (depending on their size, route, and altitude) may be practically invisible to the radar system. Tightening our air borders must be paired with establishing additional radiolocation posts in the east, which together with the already existing ones would form a radar control field of an adequate size to ensure thorough control of the air at low altitudes. Such a system, however, is very costly, and an effective tightening of the air borders is almost exclusively under conditions of a pending threat of war.

For some time now, as meager funds from the budget flowed in, the radiolocation infrastructure has been developed on the "eastern wall," yet the aim of the system is primarily defense during a conflict, and not to counteract smuggling operations.

An alternative to the concept of developing a stationary terrestrial radiolocation system along the "eastern wall," the cost of which is estimated at a minimum of 6 trillion old zlotys, would be the purchase and installation of an airborne reconnaissance system resembling AWACS, but in a miniature form. The experience of Western states shows, however, that an air-based radiolocation reconnaissance system (despite its huge, indisputable advantages) is incapable of fully replacing a terrestrial-based system, if only due to the various conditions limiting its performance (such as weather). It is always used as a means of support, enhancing the performance of the stationary system.

It should also be kept in mind that no civilian terrestrial or airborne radiolocation system in the world (even when it is aided by satellite reconnaissance) is exact enough to detect all small craft flying at low altitudes, when they are still at a safe distance from the borders of our country. The U.S.-Mexican border, air smuggling of drugs and illegal immigrants in that region, and the case of Mathias Rust in the former USSR are good examples. Military counteraction to such violations, even if quick and expensive fighters or ground support helicopters are used for detection, is difficult. Not to mention the fact that the Armed Forces are not responsible for the fight against smuggling, one should first of all compare the costs of military counteraction with the results. A similar problem exists along the Baltic Sea. The inviolability of the sea borders is undisputable, yet due to the costs of such operations, the Navy cannot be expected to direct their activities at intercepting foreign fishing boats in our maritime exclusion zone.

Currently, the problem of unwelcome foreign visitors is most acute along our northeastern border. Ukrainian craft visited us in the not so distant past—after flying in several dozen immigrants from Asia and Africa at a time, they returned to their home bases. When a bilateral agreement was signed on air traffic, exchange of information in the border zone, and severe disciplinary and penitentiary sanctions were imposed against Ukrainian military pilots, illegal traffic in this area subsided. Bilateral agreements on air traffic with our other eastern neighbors—Belarus and Lithuania—on which work and talks are well advanced, thus seem one way of solving the problem.

The difficulty is that some of these states, for example Lithuania, also lack radiolocation systems that would allow them to detect craft flying at low altitudes. When the Red Army withdrew from Lithuania, it dismounted its equipment leaving the Armed Forces of the republic helpless, in terms of radar control. Lithuania has recently received two stations produced in the West. Still, until they are installed, the skies over Vilnius will remain unprotected for some time.

If Polish airspace is violated, Border Guard units, the police, and WLiOP are notified. Cooperation between these services is defined by interministerial agreements which have been amended and perfected over the last few years. The lack of adequate technical, in particular -financial resources, makes it impossible in many cases for these services (especially the services supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs—the Border Guards, Customs Service, and the police) to react promptly to border violations.

Objectives of this type should thus be implemented by specialized and competent institutions, of course in cooperation with the Armed Forces, drawing upon their potential and possibilities. Therefore, the issue of tightening radar control of our borders and the detection of all aircraft is only a part of the problem. A special system made up of separate, specially trained units of the police and the Border Guards formed into pursuit patrols or groups should be established, equipped with helicopters, fast jeeps, a telecommunications system, etc. Such forces would have to be on constant alert and have information links with the radiolocation system. It is, of course, possible to form such groups, but this would require that decisions be made by top state authorities.

Counteraction in the air alone is not enough. Even if we do assume that a plane is detected and intercepted, the question remains, "What then?" Should the aircraft be forced to land? If so, where? Airports are far away from the borders, and landing in remote areas carries with it the risk of danger. Perhaps we should only chase the intruders away? What should the air crew do if the intruders attempt to escape or if they put up resistance upon landing? What if firearms are used? Who should take responsibility for that? What will be the consequences of such operations when it turns out that the plane simply strayed off course or has a damaged navigational system? What will happen if in the course of an operation we cause a plane carrying illegal immigrants to crash? One can never be sure in such cases whether he is dealing with an enemy or "merely" a perpetrator, a smuggler, a fugitive, or with an emergency situation, for which no one can be blamed.

The whole problem is, as we can see, extremely complex, and the responsibility of solving it rests only partly with WLiOP.

Ministry Team To Combat Terrorist Bombings

LD2303184495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has announced that a team to combat terrorist bombings will be set up at the ministry. The team will include the head of the State Protection Office [UOP], the chief commandant of the police, the chief of the Border Guard, and the commander of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] Vistulan Military Units.

Last year, 20 people died in Poland and 23 were injured as a result of 83 bomb explosions. This year there have been more than 20 explosions, in which four people have died. The main police headquarters admits that the so-called clear-up rate for offenses of this kind is nonexistent because the victims refuse to cooperate with the police.

PD Blames Government for Not Signing Treaty

AU2403115395 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 22 Mar 95 p 3

[Statement from PD Press Bureau: "The Responsibility for the Failure of the Bilateral Treaty With Hungary Rests With the Vacaroiu Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Examining the information received from its representative at the meetings held at government headquarters, the leadership of the Democratic Party [PD] notes the following:

Alone Among Neighbors

1. Romania has been brought to, and is currently in, a state of serious international isolation and has not been able to sign a single alliance treaty with any of its neighbors; has not succeeded in ensuring at least Slovakia's solidarity in the negotiations with Hungary; and has not been able to give a favorable answer to the urges of the French, German, and U.S. Governments, or to the recommendations of the EU and NATO on establishing regional security.

A Historic Chance Has Been Missed

2. So far, Romania has not succeeded in obtaining clear-cut recognition of its borders with Hungary through the signing of a treaty with the neighboring country, although it had a historic chance in this respect, one that is decreasing with every passing day since 20 March 1995.

Placed Before Faits Accomplis

3. The Vacaroiu government, as usual, turned to the opposition parties only when there was nothing else to do, placing them in front of an fait accompli, exclusively out of the desire to hide its culpability from domestic and international public opinion, and did this even at the risk of allowing the belief that not only a transitional government but a whole country supports an erroneous policy.

Pretexts Used To Justify the Refusal

4. The thorough examination of the provisions included in Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which were invoked to justify the refusal to sign the treaty with Hungary, demonstrate that this document does not accept either the idea of collective rights of minorities or the idea of administrative autonomy on ethnic grounds, as the Vacaroiu government deceitfully informed the Romanian public. The government of the Slovak Republic also relied on such an examination and such conclusions when it agreed to sign the treaty with Hungary.

Serious Danger for National Security

5. The Vacaroiu government and the parties that support it—namely the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], PRM [Greater Romania Party], and PSM [Socialist Party of Labor]—have consciously accepted Romania's international isolation and the dangers deriving from it for our national security just because peace with Hungary and interethnic tranquility, which would have resulted from the treaty, would have snatched away their nationalist extremist electoral arguments, with which they hope to continue in office. (...)

Taking into account these facts, the PD believes that the Vacaroiu government and the four parties on which it relies—namely the PDSR, PUNR, PRM, and PSM—are the only ones responsible for the serious state of danger in which Romania currently finds itself and must bear the political consequences of their deeds. (...)

'Ethnic Autonomy' Actions To Be Punishable

LD2203151095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's supreme defense council is significantly expanding the sphere of actions that threaten national security. Details from Tibor Bogdan in Bucharest:

[Bogdan] The body, chaired by President Ion Iliescu, is formulating a new group of punishable deeds in its proposals for the amendment to the law on national security. These concern the nationalities—first and foremost the Hungarian minority—and interdict certain points in the doctrines and programs of certain political parties.

In the terms of the new proposed measures, which the relevant parliamentary committee will most probably adopt, actions aimed at ethnic autonomy that are a threat to the country's unity and territorial integrity, as well as calls for territorial separatism, in fact qualify as dangerous acts from the point of view of Romania's national security.

The creation of autonomous enclaves is also punishable, since these, according to the proposed law amendment, represent a (?transitional) phase on the road leading to territorial separatism.

Incidentally, when these proposals become enshrined in law, the network of secret service informants will also become significantly expanded, since the new measures guarantee them legal protection.

Defense Minister Tinca Views Army Reform

AU2303131795 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 10 Mar 95 p 11

[Interview with National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Reghina Varvici; place and date not given: "What We Want, Where We Stand, and What We Are Doing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Varvici] Minister Tinca, what stage has been reached so far in the army reform process and what are your views regarding its restructuring and modernizing?

[Tinca] Reform is a relatively lengthy process that cannot be completed in just a few years. As a matter of fact, healthy bodies permanently adapt to life circumstances, which also change continuously. That is, when the reform is concluded—which will change the aspect of the army—this institution will continue to be in perpetual motion, rather than freeze again forever. We hope to achieve this ability to adapt itself precisely as a result of the current reform. In a broader sense the Army reform began immediately after the revolution. The course it took was influenced considerably by the successive shocks the Army had to put up with. However, in the proper sense of the word, the reform process actually began in 1993, when there was more peace to work out a draft establishing its various stages, concrete goals, and deadlines. Meanwhile, the Army's public image improved, so we went on with the reform. This year we will conclude the first stage, which we called the reorganization of the Army—that is, the establishing of its structure, a necessary step to reach the next stages. As a matter of fact currently we are also considering the next stages—achieving new educational, training, equipping, resource-using, and other such systems—but our efforts are now concentrated on the first stage, reorganization, which, as I said before, we will conclude this year.

[Varvici] Why did the Army reform appear necessary? Could the decisive factors for this be the collapse of the alliance we used to belong to, the Warsaw Treaty? And our current wish to join the other alliance, NATO?

[Tinca] I do not think there is any direct cause-effect relationship between the two elements you mentioned and the Army reform. However, one can see some connection between the reform and each of those elements. Nevertheless, the reform was neither directly nor decisively influenced by those elements. The reform was necessary long before the 1989 revolution. After 1969 and even before, there used to be a certain orientation in our defense policy setting our national interests as a priority. Nevertheless, by being a member of the Warsaw Treaty, owing to our juridical commitments there, we belonged to an alliance that limited our basing the defense conception entirely on our national interests. We had to maintain forces that were larger than the ones we actually needed, and the equipment and the organizational systems were based on a combat conception that was not ours. Our supply possibilities were restricted by an almost all-out embargo imposed on us by the West. Compared to the other Warsaw Treaty member countries our situation was better, because owing to our geographic position, as well as other reasons you probably assume, our role was intended to be just a secondary one. Our country did not lie in the direction of their main thrust and we were not considered quite reliable either. Our integration within NATO doubtlessly necessitates that we should place the Army on a different footing, raise its quality, and alter its relationship with society and other state institutions. The most important thing is not to have exactly the same equipment the NATO countries have but rather to use the same concepts and be compatible in action—that is: to be able to cooperate. The essential missions of the Army remain defensive, as is natural, and our wish to join it [NATO] is intended to obtain the solidarity of the other members for the accomplishment of those missions. I would say that the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty and our integration within NATO favors the attaining of our goal, namely the modernization of our Army, which is the essential purpose of the reform. I said it favors this because modernization was necessary long before 1991, when the Warsaw Pact disappeared, or before 1994, when we signed the Partnership for Peace. We seem to be forgetting, and therefore would be well advised to recall more often, how our Army used to be in the eighties. Or where the reckless policy of those years, reaching to aberration, led to.

Up to the end of 1989 the Army had been turned into a disciplined and very cheap labor force. When the revolution broke out, the Army had 80,300 of its military and 5,150 of its civilian personnel—that is, about 25 percent of its forces at that time—working at national economy building sites. Besides these, numerous cadres had been deployed to various enterprises or to farming units to lend a hand during the summer and autumn agricultural campaigns. Thus, most of the military units were merely manned by the guards. The units were given output quotas for various crops to be grown either by using Army property lots or land put at their disposal by the CAP's [agricultural production cooperatives]. I heard about an air force regiment commander, for instance, who, together with his aides, pledged to weed a certain quota of maize plots. Most of the Danube-Black Sea navigation channel was built by the Army, as well as the irrigation channels, the People's House and the blocks of flats that surround it, industrial projects, and so on. Now this accounts for many things and its consequences can be still felt quite acutely.

I do not know whether anyone can provide exact statistics about the number of soldiers who died in the mines because coal production partly relied on their work. The Army was in an advanced state of disorganization from a professional and moral viewpoint. This happened at a time when a new political and strategic framework was emerging in Europe, particularly after 1990. The conventions on reducing armaments and military troops in Europe have taken effect: Through the limits on arms and equipment that they stipulate, these conventions also oblige us to make serious adjustments in this respect. Thus, quality becomes a stringent necessity without which one cannot responsibly talk about the country's defense. The gulfbetween what we had in 1989 and the Army we must have in the year 2000 is indicative of the seriousness of the work we must do.

[Varvici] Can one say that the limits you referred to have had negative implications for the evolution of the process of reform? By that I mean to ask whether it would have been easier for us without these limits.

[Tinca] Maybe, but only if we mistake a gradual process for delays and inconsistencies. I think that the advantages were greater, on the whole. From the beginning, these limits have imposed very exact parameters on the reform concept, as regards the available means and resources. Then, at a European level, these conventions, as well as the instruments referring to various measures of trust and security, provide a certain foundation to the framework of stability and trust among countries through the exertion of control over the Armed forces. On the other hand, each country is obliged by circumstances to organize what is left of its Armed Forces after the reduction as best it can, and to compensate for the losses incurred by reaching new levels of efficiency and of technological, operational, and professional performance. I think that this is a good thing because it forces us to think more and work better. Moreover, defense expenditures will definitely be cut in the longer run. Here is a list with the limits imposed for Romania: Tanks—from 2,966 tanks to 1,375 (54 percent reduction); artillery of 100 millimeters and more—from 3,928 pieces to 1,475 (62 percent); armored cars—from 3,153 to 2,100 (33 percent); and combat aircraft—from 508 to 370 (27 percent).

The reduction in heavy armaments and technology is done on the basis of a timetable, the fulfillment of which is periodically checked by international commissions of experts. Romania is in step with its timetable. Up to now, we have reduced 60 percent of what is stipulated for us.

Regarding the number of troops, at the start of the restructuring process, the Army had positions for 268,582 military personnel (cadres and conscripts) and 37,919 civilians. According to the established concept, by the year 2000 the Army will have 195,573 military personnel and 33,200 civilian employees. Up to now, some 22,707 positions have been cut, and the process is still continuing.

[Varvici] From the viewpoint of the number of troops, what will the Army look like in a few years?

[Tinca] We would like the number of civilians employed in the Army to come pretty close to that of the officers. Conscripts will represent some 43 percent of the overall number of troops. In the year 2000, some 25,000 sergeants will be employed on a contract basis. Taking into consideration the reform of the military education system, I believe we will have a new and more professional army, which will operate in a different way to ensure the country's defense and participate in humanitarian and peacekeeping actions.

[Varvici] Mr. Minister, voices can be heard in the Senate or the press to the effect that the personnel reductions will increase the ranks of the unemployed with laid-off officers. What is true and what is false in these allegations?

[Tinca] We do not want to produce social tremors by our measures. The personnel reduction will take into consideration retirement and resignation levels and will be in keeping with the dynamics of the education process. We do not want to produce unemployment. At the same time, we will increase our exigency in assessing the personnel's performance: Those who do not fulfill the duties for which they are paid and those who do not behave in accordance with the extant statutes, orders, and rules will have only themselves to blame for the unpleasant situation in which they find themselves. These measures are being applied in all modern armies and we cannot act differently, if we want to ensure professionalism and discipline. All the neighboring countries are going through such a process and some of them are faced with even greater difficulties.

[Varvici] Let us come back to reorganization. In the first stage of the reform, what was achieved in concrete terms?

[Tinca] You probably want me to begin from the top, am I right? Well, at the ministry level, we turned some 100 military positions into civilian ones—beginning with the minister himself—and we filled them with civilians. It is important to achieve efficient cooperation between soldiers and civilians in the fulfillment of the ministry's duties. The General Staff now has greater duties, since it practically took over the management of the training and functioning of operational troops. Compared to January 1991, the reorganization at this level and in the ministry's subordinated structures meant a cut of 723 posts. In November 1993 we set up the general staffs of the three categories of arms—Land Troops, Aviation and Air Defense, and Navy—while in 1994 we set up seven Army Corps commands, the Army Corps units, and the commands of brigades and brigade subunits. Concurrently, we dismantled the commands of divisions (mechanized and tanks) and regiments (mechanized, tanks, and artillery). We set up the General Staff of the Military Fleet and we will set up a general staff of the Danube Fleet. Other Army corps will be set up this year and the (division) battalions will be reorganized, since they are basic combat units. The four armies will be rearranged into three, with spheres of responsibility established on the criterion of maximum utilization of the advantages offered by the country's geography.

This year we will also basically change the configuration of military aviation and air defense. The new structure of aviation—corps units, fleets, bases, and artillery and paratrooper brigades—proceeds from the need to efficiently apportion and use aircraft and artillery pieces left to us after we finish cutting back their numbers, so as not to diminish the country's air defense capacity. Everything linked to organizational structures will be concluded by the end of this year. It is going to be a difficult period, particularly due to the material and social problems that will emerge. We took a number of measures to attenuate unpleasant consequences, given the fact that we are going through a housing crisis, economic recession, and so forth.

Anyhow, the dislocations of personnel will be limited to the strictly necessary, and this whole process will not be a reason or criterion for placing soldiers on reserve duty. What is more, this redimensioning and reorganization is not immobile. If we ascertain disruptions, or mistakes in concept vis-a-vis reality, or even too-great social costs, we can make the necessary adjustments. The important thing is to develop a structure, which we can work on and improve. After all, we must start this process sometime and somewhere.

[Varvici] As far as I know, the budget allocated this year to the Ministry of National Defense does not cover the Army's needs. To what effect will this affect the reform process?

[Tinca] The budget for our ministry, which was recently approved, amounts to 2,062 billion lei; an extra sum of three billion lei in excess of the draft budget was allocated by a joint Parliament session for peacekeeping missions abroad. Chapter by chapter, this is how the budget looks: 1,771.7 billion lei for defense expenditures; 13.410 billion lei for education; 65.684 billion lei for pensions, assistance, and other allowances; 55 billion lei for housing; 18.560 billion lei for research; about 3 billion lei for culture, sports, and child allowances; and 59.537 billion lei for other expenditures.

The budget figure is insufficient, but it reflects the real financing resources of an austerity budget. The defense expenditures amount to 2.52 percent of the domestic gross product, compared to 2.39 percent in 1994 and 2.13 percent in 1993. Calculated in U.S. dollars, the military budget amounted to $364 million in 1993, $708 million in 1994, and now it amounts to $779.2 million in 1995. We will strive to administer these funds as well as possible, so as to fulfill our targets. This will allow us to improve to a certain extent the situation of some sectors—such as in aviation—and will enable us to support the training program and improve the living conditions of the soldiers. I would like to mention that capital expenditures amount to 527.298 billion lei and that we hope to invest more in the purchase of domestic technology at an acceptable qualitative level. I would like to add that the 55 billion lei allocated for housing will allow us to continue construction in 29 garrisons and start construction in other 25 garrisons. The budget is an austerity budget, but even so, the restructuring program will be concluded this year.

[Varvici] You said that by the reorganization of the Army a structure will be erected that favors work. Will they work differently? And if so, how?

[Tinca] I hope so. The main issues are those pertaining to defense planning, the ability of the newly created structures to interoperate [interoperabilitate], and the efficient management of resources. This presupposes a higher professional level, exceptional respect for the work done by others, maximum responsibility in one's own work, and a flexible way of thinking and acting.

If everything is well organized and able to function, when the go signal is given it all has to start running automatically, if I may say so. In order for us to reach that stage we need to alter certain frames of mind and habits we have acquired and which, from the subjective point of view, one is reluctant to give up. Furthermore, we also need a new legislative framework. What we have now is the National Defense Bill, which is very useful but not sufficient. Defense is not something that has to do solely with the defense ministry. The Senate has passed the draft bills of the package that was forwarded to Parliament. We hope that during the current session the Chamber of Deputies will also pass the bill on the preparation of the population, the bill on the preparation of the territory for defense, and the bill on the statutes of the military cadres. Besides all this, if we want the new structures to run well, we need to study, and therefore the military education system will also be reconsidered. The CSAT [Supreme Defense Council of the Country] has sanctioned the principles on the reform of military education, the basic coordinates of which are imposed by the evolution of the international and domestic military and social environment.

[Varvici] What is new in the principles you mentioned?

[Tinca] First I have to clarify something: This reform does not mean that we wish to turn bad education into good but rather to turn the education that was good under certain circumstances into another good one under other, completely different circumstances. The latter are as follows: a restructured and modernized army, a military and political context requiring compatibility with modern armaments and equipment, a different type of interpersonal relations, and so on. The current system is a great consumer of personnel, it is impossible to integrate it within the national education system, and it is a great consumer of resources. Modern education is intended to form officers able to lead people, as well as military echelons both during peacetime and war who are also true experts in their military domain, good fighters, good teachers, good managers of education issues, and good citizens—in other words: officers who are able to think and act efficiently to ensure national security and also able to adequately cooperate with the international security bodies. At the academies of the three main military branches, in the first years of study we will introduce general theoretical education, identical for each of those branches, comprising fundamental scientific education, as well as basic military education, which will be followed by applied training and specialization in various military fields. The education system will be changed in a similar way—although adapted to their specific needs—in the schools training warrant and noncommissioned officers. The very first to undergo such changes are the military high schools.

[Varvici] Are these efforts to train cadres able to fit into a new system, as we have seen, accompanied by similar efforts intended for simple soldiers?

[Tinca] Of course, restructuring also encompasses the combat training of conscripts. The officers trained on the basis of the new principles I mentioned will hopefully develop a different frame of mind, which we expect them to convey to the noncommissioned officers as well. Besides all this, the currently active cadre generations will also have to adapt. The new education system will help them in this, but they will also have to make personal efforts. Beginning with 1 November 1994 the training of conscripts is done in a different way than before. In the first four months the young men are trained in special units, where 20 to 40 percent of the time is destined to adapt the civilians to military requirements and teach them general military things (regulations, basic combat training, sanitary training, civic education, humanitarian laws, and so on.) About 60 to 80 percent of the time is dedicated to special training according to the branch of military service and the position the enlisted men will occupy in their units. The new element in this consists in the fact that when the men get to their combat units, they are already trained. In the months that follow, the emphasis is laid on their getting accustomed to the teamwork within their groups, crews, or platoons. Depending on the progress they make, they are then promoted as specialists and as low-ranking commanders. However, their real place and role in their unit is defined during the tactical drills, with or without combat shooting, during which each fighter contributes to the success of his unit, while actually such drills are nothing but cold replicas of the genuine battlefield. Of course, there will still be corrections and rethinking in this domain when we draw our conclusions.

[Varvici] Will the conscripts be offered the possibility to do their service close to their homes? Will the enlisting be done locally?

[Tinca] That is one of the objectives we wish to attain. That is what they do in other countries, so we would like to do the same. However, for the time being, I do not believe that it is possible everywhere in the country. There are regions, some of which are extremely important, where the demographic growth is low or negative. Let us take, for instance, the Tulcea region or that of the Danube Delta. How could we possibly ensure the necessary manpower if we were to rely solely on the locals? We have to bring people from other regions. On the other hand there are other regions that are, let us say, saturated, and therefore we have to send their youth away to do their service. If we introduced local enlisting in the stage we are currently at, life would become even more complicated for us. Nevertheless, we regard this issue as an objective over the next years, when we hope for better times and fewer problems.

[Varvici] Esteemed Minister, in your opinion what are the connections between the restructuring of the army and foreign military policy?

[Tinca] The foreign relations of the army are part of the foreign military policy of our state. If your question refers to the partnership and integration issues, I can say that we managed to achieve a few things in that domain. On 31 January, for instance, we handed over to the North-Atlantic Alliance headquarters a document titled "Romania—A Global Interoperativeness [Interoperabilitate] Study for the Partnership for Peace." We participated in over 70 activities carried out in view of our cooperation with NATO: drills, exercises, courses, seminars, symposia, conferences, workshops, or meetings of certain committees, agencies, or NATO work groups. Our 1995 schedule of cooperation actions within the Partnership for Peace is quite busy. I would mention just a few of them, the more important ones. We are to organize in our country an exercise of the land troops bearing the name Trust '95, as well as the exercises Black Sea '95 and Danube '95. I will not go into detail. Romanian military units will participate in the Cooperative Bridge '95 exercises to be organized by NATO in Hungary, the Classica '95 and Hesperide '95 exercises in Italy, and in mountain unit drills in Greece. Our field hospital and the peacekeeping battalion are to leave for Angola, under the aegis of the UN. This is a very important mission for the Romanian Army. About 1,000 men are to leave for Angola and so far we have never had an operation with such dimensions. Just to make things clear I would like to point out that the expenses are to be reimbursed by the UN. Two other peacekeeping battalions are currently being set up and trained. Our opening up to the world and to cooperation with other nations in their effort to support peace by crisis-tempering actions represents an important part of the restructuring and modernization of our army.

[Varvici] You offered us a quite comprehensive picture. Do you wish to add anything?

[Tinca] I would like to mention our constant efforts—which this year are to be especially great—to maintain the operative state of our forces and to strengthen discipline. The two aforementioned elements pertain to the army's reason for existing, be it reformed or not. It should be always ready to do its duty. During the process of reorganization or that of our opening and integration we would not like to lose precisely what is essential. Vigilance has to be permanently present because the higher interests of our country are at stake. I like to use the phrase "change as you go" to describe the reform of our army.

Tinca Interviewed by EUROPA Journalist

95P20623A Bucharest EUROPA in Romanian
10-25 Jan 95 pp 3-4, 12

[Interview with Minister of National Defense Gheorghe Tinca by Floriana Jucan; place and date not given: "Caution Is Not Justified on the Basis of Fear of Change"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *[Jucan] Last year I gave myself, as birthday present, a week in Switzerland. In the Zurich* *airport, I spotted [Minister of National Defense] Mr. [Gheorghe] Tinca whom, I did not know personally...but observing him carefully I told myself that I should not fail to take advantage of the opportunity. I not only took advantage of the moment to get to know one of the most charming ministers in the Vacaroiu cabinet but I also managed to coax him into giving me an interview when he returned to Romania. Here is the interview for our readers.*

[Jucan] Mr. Minister, what is the status of the country's defense capability after the events of December 1989? What do the organization and modernization of the army involve?

[Tinca] The transition process that followed the December 1989 revolution affected the army, as it did every institution of the Romanian state, in a fundamental way. I say "fundamental" because I am thinking about the way in which the process was conceived. The way the missions were conceived, in one place or another, affected the army, perhaps indirectly, as a result of the bad situation in the national economy. There is a direct connection between the potential of the Army and the industrial potential. The Army cannot be conceived of as an institution that is isolated from other institutions of society. The Army continues to be affected by the crisis the transition entails.

Before you construct something, you have two choices: you can either tear down what you already have and build something else, running the risk of not having any place to live for a while, or you can transform the house into something else—an alternative which seems quite attractive to me. Therefore, in the Army, we are trying to proceed in a very cautious manner, in introducing reforms. However, caution is not justified by fear of change or of reform; it is justified by concern not to disturb the inner structures and links of this organism, both internally and externally.

The resources that we can allocate to the military, on the basis of the state of the economy and of industry, are insufficient. We have an austerity budget that does not satisfy the needs of the Army. However, I believe that through self-sacrifice and because of the military cadres' sense of responsibility, we have been able to raise the Army to a level of combativity and effectiveness that, in the opinion of our strategists, is sufficient for the current missions based on the military doctrine of the country.

The reform in which we are engaged entails material resources that we hope will come as the economy becomes stronger. Indeed, in 1994 and 1995, the government has given indications that it is aware of the need to provide a larger budget for the modernization of national defense. As for military technology, we do not envisage modernization or reform in the Army on the basis of purchases from abroad. First of all, we intend to streamline the Romanian defense industry, which is very well-developed horizontally. We must bring its technology up to today's level. Indeed, the defense industry needs an infusion of technology. The change cannot take place without technology. Therefore, orientation toward sources of technology is a determining factor on the political level. It does not matter to us if these sources are in the West or in the East.

In regard to equipment, I do not think anyone should expect the Romanian army to be equipped with the latest generation of weapons. First of all, we need things we can make ourselves, and this is a link to civilian industry. We are moving towards solid firms that can transfer technology in a real way—not only to satisfy certain defense needs—and we hope that we can benefit from this retooling in the economy and civilian industry. Therefore, there are two considerations: first, defense; and, of equal importance, the technological progress that could result for civilian industry.

This restructuring has a very high social cost. It is my opinion that we are far from having a clear picture of the restructuring of the defense industry. The report of a commission set up to deal with this issue will be examined by the Supreme Council for National Defense, but this report will not be the whole thing; it will serve as a framework in which something will be done, taking the real situation into consideration. We have a retooling-restructuring component that depends upon equipment, technologies, etc.; we should give the same importance to the situation of thousands of workers who will not find jobs in this new defense industry. Specialists, who are often confused with specialized workers, do not make up the entire labor force. The problems of recycling the labor force are very difficult and I believe we must approach them by thinking about this aspect, first of all. Probably, the delay in carrying out this reform in the area of defense is a result of this caution and concern for these people, which some consider to be excessive.

In summary, therefore: The defense industry is doing very poorly, and it is no secret that it does not stand out in industry as a whole. When the matter of resources is brought up, we are hit once again by the austerity budget. But I believe that, with foreign cooperation, we will be able to carry out some reinvigoration of the industry in the coming period.

As part of the reform, we want to increasse the combat potential—even though the number of troops will be reduced—through greater flexibility, through more rapid action and reaction.

I would like to assure you that the reform in the Ministry of National Defense will not produce a single unemployed officer.

[Jucan] I know that you have been very much involved in analyzing the current situation in the Air Force and the causes of numerous recent accidents. Could you tell us, in a few words, your views on this subject?

[Tinca] The disturbing thing is that the number of accidents is higher than the assumed risk, since there is an assumed risk in aviation. In Romania, there are more accidents than the acceptable number. Careful studies have been made and we have identified pilot training as one of the principal causes. This seems shocking, since we know that Romanian pilots are among the best in the world. However, in the Air Force, their level of training is deficient. We are not talking about their human qualities but about their training. Also, there is the infrastructure on the ground: The tarmacs and the piloting equipment are outmoded. I will not talk about the pilots' working conditions. Everyone is looking for the causes! Well, the disturbing situation in the Air Force today is the cumulative result of irresponsible negligence over a period of 10-15 years.

In the early days of the Air Force, the flight hours were comparable to those of the other branches of the service. Later, because of the schedule reserved for the Army, these hours were reduced to save fuel. The situation must be corrected. Let me give you an example: Today's instructors were trained in this "window" of 10-15 years. We could increase the number of flight hours, taking them from other areas, but this presupposes that you have aircraft. We have a rather large number of unusable airplanes, which means that we have to buy spare parts to put them into operation. In addition, we would have to renovate all the tarmacs or construct others. The entire infrastructure on the ground would have to be improved, and this would require billions of lei. I do not think that the country's budgets for two years would be enough to improve the situation in the Air Force; and even in this case, I do not think we would be able to solve the situation in a year or two. This year [1994] we proposed raising the number of flight hours to 42, and to 50 in 1995. In any case, the Air Force will be allocated substantial funds in the national defense budget and will enjoy a certain priority.

On many occasions, I have tried to say—but have not been listened to by the press or by the parliamentarians—that the government is aware of and has a detailed knowledge of the situation in the Air Force and that the government is trying, within the limits of this austerity budget, to allocate as much funding as possible, which would demonstrate a certain attention. In regard to the air force, in my opinion, the essential issue is money, but the use of this money is just as important. To get money, one must demonstrate high responsibility in its use, cut waste, reduce consumption, and give careful thought to each expenditure. We should use the energy we expend in clamoring for funds to learn how to get along on the funds we have.

[Jucan] To what extent can Romania be involved in peacekeeping missions?

[Tinca] We have set up a rather well-equipped, adequately trained batallion. It can have a dual role: participating in peacekeeping actions—but under no circumstances in military police actions or in imposing peace; and, on the other hand, it can serve as the nucleus of what all might take place in all the infantry battalions in Romania, in respect to instruction and military discipline.

A second battalion is being formed in Craiova and we plan to organize a third.

[Jucan] Might we become involved in peacekeeping operations in neighboring areas?

[Tinca] I do not think so, because we have no intention of moving away from here. They are our neighbors and I do not think that the Romanian public and, in particular, the participants, would be in agreement.

[Jucan] Remember the Budapest meeting at which Boris Yeltsin gave a very vehement speech in which he drew attention to the attempt to isolate Russia?

[Tinca] I do not think anyone is trying to isolate Russia. If there is any such tendency, it comes from inside Russia. Europe has made enough moves to involve Russia in European reconstruction. Also, I see that there is a certain agreement with forces existing there that want to democratize Russia and transform it into a partner in a civilized Europe. In making this comment, perhaps I am a bit dominated by our attitude toward Russia, which is an attitude without hostility and suspicion. I often reread Titulescu's book, especially the part about relations with the former USSR, which is striking in its relevance to the current situation.

I do not believe Romania will have any politicians who are so naive or immature as to engage in a hostile policy toward Russia. (Of course, in World War II we fought against Russia. It was not our fault. We had to regain our territory). The main thing is that we have no interest in a hostile policy toward Russia. But at the same time, I do not think Russia has given any signs of opening up to Romania. In my opinion, our country's dossier is somewhere near the bottom of a pile of dossiers on Russia's desk. In addition, it seems that Russia does not have enough time to give more importance to relations with Romania, an attitude which makes the dialogue between the two countries more difficult. If we want to enter into the Euro-Atlantic structures, it is not to isolate Russia but because we need the Western market.

It is regrettable that Russia does not appreciate the fact that the countries in the area have an interest in Russia. There is talk about the expansion of NATO to the east. I would not state it this way because there is talk about the integration of the countries in Central and East Europe into NATO. We are talking not about a movement from the West to the East but from the East to the West. There are certain differences which, if they are understood incorrectly, might give rise to future insecurity.

[Jucan] Since you mentioned Russia, the Red Army was considered to be one of the strongest armies in the world. Don't you think that forced relations between armies in Central and East Europe and NATO might irritate, to the maximum, the Russian authorities that are giving evidence of a certain verbal vehemence? Could the current 14th Army constitute a danger, generally speaking?

[Tinca] The Red Army is going through a trauma that it is resisting heroically. Rarely in history has such an important army in such an important area—important not just for Russians or Americans but for all countries—had to withdraw so rapidly, with an immense cost to society. It is, then, a matter of a psychological trauma, which can be more easily understood by a politician than by a military man accustomed to a certain order, a certain mentality, whom you have to convince of the justness of what is happening. Despite all the shortcomings—which are written about very often in the press—I believe the Red Army is going through this process in a responsible manner. Does our Army have problems? Even though it is far from having the discipline, outlook, dimensions, and ideology of the Red Army, it is a similar army.

After 1969, we had a completely different treatment and Romania was a "wayward child" in the Warsaw Pact. We could say that we are getting along more easily than we did before, but we still have serious difficulties.

You can imagine what these difficulties might be! In addition, the country is constantly harassed by the conflicts that have taken place from the Russian borders to the borders of the former USSR.

In conclusion, despite the speculations, I think things are going rather well for the moment. I would add the nuclear component, which has been forgotten recently, even though it is very important in international relations, in the concept of the military doctrine of certain states, especially the nuclear states. It is a great responsibility to have nuclear weapons, and so far, I have not heard that the nuclear component would be commanded by any irresponsible people.

On the other hand, the Army does what the politician tells it to do. If anyone thinks that there might be any danger for us and for Europe, I do not think it will come from the Red Army as such, but from those who are directing it from the political point of view. The Army can be integrated very well in a society which could develop democratically. Therefore, I do not believe fear of the Red Army is justified unless the political leadership does not respect the basic rules of democracy.

[Jucan] Don't you think that the countries of Central and East Europe need economic security more than military protection at the present time?

[Tinca] The question is very interesting because it makes us think of another theory: Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

You might say that it is the chicken. I could tell you that it is the egg and I would give you the following example: After World War II, the West Europeans, especially the Germans, who were on the ground, emerged practically impoverished. How did Germany achieve such power and how did the other West European countries develop so well? Undoubtedly, it was a matter of American aid, the Marshall Plan, and before that, I might say, the discipline of these people and the way in which they knew how to work. All these could be developed under the NATO umbrella. Whether or not this was efficient from a military point of view remains a matter of discussion, since there was no military confrontation. The Cold War was not won in the military field but in the political field. We do not know which Army is better, NATO or the Red Army, and a confrontation is not desirable.

Thus, if we think about ourselves: We emerged from the Cold War. We did not have Germany's situation, but with much effort, we have come close to it through our own efforts—as the liberals say. The problem is to get assistance, but this does not come out of the air, because no one gives you a bag of money and tells you: "Spend it any way you want!"

We are talented, but our organization leaves something to be desired. However, we are lacking something: This zone of our country and of the Central and East European countries does not have a statute. It is a grey area. Serious investors will come when this confused situation is crystallized.

We wonder whether there should first be economic development and, after that, security, or a sense of security and stability that would promote a process of economic development.

We cannot neglect economic security, but probably, in this restructuring process, there would have to be a certain stability to exert a more positive influence on economic development.

[Jucan] What do you think of the intensification of relations between Germany and Hungary, not only in the political but also in the military sphere? Do they have any positive or negative effect, or any influence on Romania's relations with each of the countries individually?

[Tinca] Relations between Germany and Hungary are older. In the context of the 1989 revolutions, they came to center stage as a result of the assistance Hungary gave in launching the process for the reunification of Germany. There is a certain feeling of gratitude that the Germans have for the Hungarians, which took concrete form in many respects—even in the military sphere—in aid. It is a matter of hundreds of railroad cars with spare parts—they say—but we know that they are assemblies that are placed end to end on the other side. But Hungary is still owed a debt by the former USSR that now belongs to Russia, and Russia is delivering MiG-20 aircraft, on its account.

Leaving Russia aside, we might think that there is a certain closeness between Germany and Hungary which must be a matter of concern for us.

I can tell you that I know what it is about, but of course not all the details. However, we hope that Germany is not what it was before World War II. I know that very profound processes took place here, and we have reasons to believe that the dominant factor in German foreign policy is a vision of a united Europe.

Relations between Germany and Romania are not the least bit alarming if we look at them from the viewpoint of investors. On the contrary: Germany is in first place in Romania as a trading partner—which makes me happy because, as we know, Germans are serious people.

Things are not so smooth in the political domain, and I do not understand why, but I think this situation is being remedied.

President Iliescu had a meeting with Helmut Kohl and with President Herzog, in Essen. [Foreign Minister] Kinkel has already been to Romania, and I expect to meet with [Defense Minister] Ruhe at the end of January.

I am hoping for a more obvious rapprochement between Germany and Romania, an opening up on a different qualitative level, which will cover all areas: economic, political, military, cultural. I do not think relations between Germany and Hungary would be able to impede relations between Romania and Germany. On the contrary, I think that cooperation among the three countries, in the military area, would be very possible.

[Jucan] What is the status of our relations with Hungary from a military point of view? Are these relations influenced by politics?

[Tinca] Soldiers are not necessarily more responsible than others but they know best what can happen if a conflict or a tense situation is not well-controlled and it reaches a terminal phase.

On another agenda, the armies as institutions, both here in Romania and in Hungary, are kept apart from the political domain, which presupposes that they can understand each other better in their dialogue because they are not involved in political disputes. We have made some pioneering moves with them [the Hungarians] in Europe. We signed the "Open Skies" agreement, which does not give an advantage to either side. There is parity...we make two flights, they make two flights. There has been de facto cooperation between units or subunits located along the Romanian-Hungarian border because this has been practically inevitable. There is an annual activity plan, which has been expanded from year to year in regard to the number of actions. In 1994, we had an unofficial meeting in Gyula with the new minister (The minister made a very good impression on me. He is a very responsible, level-headed man, who is really aware of what is in the interest of Hungary, not only from the military point of view but also in general); we presented 10 proposals for cooperation—for areas of cooperation or concrete actions.

When the Hungarian defense minister came to Bucharest, he gave me the pleasant surprise of bringing the responses to the 10 proposals. I must admit that the responses were more daring than we had expected, which is a very good sign. Moreover, he added a few proposals of his own, which led to the finalization of a plan that included even some things that it would be hard to imagine could happen between Romania and Hungary. For example, a platoon or a company (we will decide later) from Romania would have joint exercises in Hungary with a Hungarian unit, and then Romania would reciprocate.

We don't know how they will communicate with each other...Since they are young, it will probably be in English; if they were older, perhaps they would be communicating in Russian.

It is not just the exercises themselves but also the fact that they will be coming to test weapons in our training field in Capul Midia and we will be going to their country with soldiers to participate in tank exercises at a place where they have a special training field.

The Midia training field is very important not only for Hungary but also for other East European countries—because, a few years ago, exercises were carried out somewhere in Kazakhstan, where there are training fields; it cost a lot, was a long way off, and so forth.

We were able to set up this training field in Midia. I believe this will be the most modern training field of this type in Europe. Then there are the exercises we will be carrying out in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. We have invited them [the Hungarians] to participate in a ground exercise, probably with mountain troops, and they have invited us to participate in an exercise that they are carrying out together with the British and the Germans, in Hungary. The invitations have been accepted, and therefore the exercises will take place.

We also intend to initiate contacts between units in the zone: exchanges, visits, discussions. Our aim is to strengthen confidence, but not only at the top level. We want to go down several levels and to reduce feelings of suspicion and animosity, which are exploited by certain interested circles. By proceeding in this way, I believe we would be able to create the best conditions for a rapprochement in relations between the two countries and for understanding.

[Jucan] How do you explain the fact that the Hungarian secret services are the most active intelligence services on Romanian territory?

[Tinca] An intelligence service is created to be active; therefore, it should be no surprise that there are active secret services in a country. You might need information and the one who has the most information has the most to gain.

The problem is what you have to do to combat this service! The intelligence war has not ended and it will never end. Perhaps our intelligence services are very active in Hungary, depending on what the Hungarians say!

[Jucan] How do you feel, as a career diplomat with almost 20 years' experience in diplomatic activity propelled rather abruptly to head the Ministry of National Defense?

[Tinca] I feel fine. I have been using, more and more, all the things I accumulated in diplomatic life—with one clarification: When we used the term diplomat, we were thinking about a person who arranges things, calculating everything so as to present them beautifully. This does not apply inside the country. I always believed that diplomacy should be carried out with your face toward foreigners and not with your face toward your own people. However, I am using my diplomatic experience very much, and also the fact that I have been concerned with disarmament and international security issues, which gives me a certain facility in understanding certain problems. I say that I can understand, although I do not know if anyone can understand what is happening in the world today.

Perhaps it is a certain ability, in relations with people, to sense what is happening. In addition, I rely very much on respect, sincerity and a certain detachment from the material side of things. I am not a poor man, but let me tell you in all certitude that I am not attracted by money.

[Jucan] Mr. Minister, thank you for your kindness in answering my questions and for the fact that our meeting lasted half an hour longer than scheduled.

Article Views Decline of Aircraft Industry

AU2303133295

[FBIS Editorial Report] The 14 and 15 March issues of TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian on page 4 carry a two-part report by Tiberiu Valciu on the situation of the ailing aircraft-manufacturing plant in Brasov County, the country's sole producer of helicopters.

Part One, headed "Even the Rich Amirs Request Compensation Deals, But the Romanians Don't!," begins with Valciu saying that "currently one of the hot spots on the trade union movement scene is the ICA [expansion unknown] aircraft and helicopter factory, whose employees have gone on strike with the sole purpose of forcing the management to obtain new orders for the factory. As this situation is not a singular, but rather a general, one throughout the country's aircraft-manufacturing industry, let us see how things have gone so far."

After explaining that the principal product of the Brasov plant is the IAR 330 Puma-type helicopter manufactured under a French license, which may also be used for combat purposes, as it can be armed with missiles, Valciu says: "This was why the Air Force, having a fleet of 100 such helicopters, used to be the factory's main customer. However, owing to budget restrictions over the past few years, the Air Force effectively froze its contracts for new aircraft and, even more serious, it also ceased general overhauls on its existing ones. Owing to this, currently a mere 20 percent of the Air Force helicopters are still operational. Although this figure has not been officially confirmed, it seems to be very plausible, as the general overhauling of many helicopters has been postponed for several years and, according to regulations, they are not allowed to take off if no such work has been done on them after a certain number of flight hours. In other words, the Air Force cannot currently use more than 20 of its 100 helicopters. How fortunate that they do not need them for real combat!"

Valciu then continues by saying that "the most recent serious contract of the Brasov helicopter manufacturer was on the delivery of 10 Puma-type helicopters to the United Arab Emirates"; although they were "second-hand" helicopters, their repair, modernization, and the production of the necessary parts covered the contract needs of the plant. Currently negotiations are under way for another 10 helicopters, which could ensure work for the next two years for the employees of both the ICA and the Bucharest-based company Turbomecanica, manufacturer of the engines. However, those negotiations have lately become more difficult because the Emirates requested that the agreement should also include a discount deal—more precisely compensation by means of Romanian investment there. There is nothing unusual about this request, as the principle of compensation in aircraft deals is a practice accepted worldwide.

The author then blames the Romanian negotiators who purchased the Airbus- and Boeing-type passenger aircraft for the Romanian air company TAROM—who, out of "shyness," asked for no compensation deals whatsoever in the Airbus case and merely for a 5-percent discount of the entire value of the deal in the case of Boeing. "This, together with the Air Force budget cuts over recent years, made the 1994 output of the aircraft industry drop to half of the 1989 figure, with direct consequences on the number of personnel employed there. From 34,000 people on their payrolls in 1989, their number dropped to less than 17,000 in 1994. Moreover, currently over half of the employees who have been kept on are technically unemployed," meaning that they remain on the company's payroll but without receiving salaries if they stay home on days when there is no production owing to lack of orders. "Considering that in this field experience and skills are fundamental elements, the consequences of such a phenomenon may be catastrophic not only for the industry itself but especially for the country's national security," the author concludes.

The headline of the second installment of the report reads: "Air Force Jets Will Not Be Crashing Any More," continuing with a subhead saying: "For the Simple Reason That They Will Not Be Flying Any Longer."

Valciu reports that "yesterday, during a news conference of the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Trade Union Confederation, the union leaders of the five companies in that branch (ICA of Brasov, Aerostar of Bacau, Avioane of Craiova, and Romaero and Turbomecanica of Bucharest) stated that the current budget policy and the strategy of the MApN [National Defense Ministry] will lead not only to the disappearance of the Romanian aircraft-manufacturing industry but also to a paralysis of the Air Force, with its aircraft grounded. Currently the country's aircraft factories have no orders for any general overhauling of the Air Force's aircraft. The MApN owes them 8 billion lei for repairs done last year, which was covered by the factories by resorting to bank loans, but the interest that they have to pay is rapidly and surely leading them toward bankruptcy. Apart from this, the jets the overhauling of which is being endlessly postponed are no more than mere inventory items, and their number is growing, as more and more of them reach the statutory number of regular flight hours. All of this is leading to a decline in the professional quality of both pilots and aircraft industry employees."

The union leaders also point out that owing to this situation, many of their experts have been migrating toward other industries, and even leaving the country, comparing the situation to the effects of the neutron bomb: "The factories, the machinery, everything is there, but the people have vanished."

Varvici then mentions that so far "no viable remedy has been able to be worked out" either by the government, or the Defense Ministry, or the parliamentary defense committees, and that none of those bodies has a clear strategy with respect to the Romanian aircraft industry, "which is one of the strongest in this part of Europe."

"Anyway, if this month's negotiations with these decisionmakers leads to no results, come April we will witness the 'takeoff' of very intense union activity in the form of protest rallies, marches, and perhaps even general strikes, although the effects of the latter will be somewhat symbolic, considering that there is no work currently available anyway," the report concludes.

PSM Opposes Nation's Plans To Join NATO

AU2403071395 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 21 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Peter Sragher: "PSM Speaks Out Against NATO Association"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few weeks ago, the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] criticized severely the Army's cadre policy, condemning Minister Gheorghe Tinca directly for placing into reserve duty a number of Romanian Army officers. But apparently it is not just the cadre policy that disturbs the PSM, but also other elements of the policy promoted by its ally, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania]. Recently the PSM opposed, in Parliament, the idea of sending a Romanian Army battalion to Angola, where it would operate as a buffer between rival factions. The reason reiterated, and at the news conference held yesterday by PSM Vice President Ioan Sasu, is that Mr. Verdet's socialists oppose "interference in internal affairs of each country." [sentence as published] It has become clear that the PSM opposes the transformations that have taken place in the past years as regards the notion and practice of collective security, promoted by the European Union and the United States, something that compels each partner-state in an alliance to assume responsibilities for the future of mankind. Mr. Sasu has not missed an occasion to take another step forward, stating openly that "NATO is a debatable structure, just like all Euro-Atlantic structures." In this respect, the PSM—once again distancing itself from the policy promoted by its ally, the PDSR, but also the policy of all opposition parties—is asking for a referendum on our country's joining or refraining from joining NATO. Thus, on this issue of vital importance, which engages the country in a long-term policy, the people should also express their will, and not just the elected representatives. The PSM leaders also attempted to alert President Ion Iliescu on this issue.

We have to note that the same party did not react in any way when Romania asked to join Partnership for Peace proposed by NATO.

Gas, Oil Resources To Run Out in 12-15 Years

AU2303182395 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 20 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Cristian Vlad: "Romania's Natural Gas and Oil Resources Will Be Exhausted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During a meeting of the economic consultative group of Romania's Presidency, Professor Aurel Leca presented a study containing the principal developmental guidelines of the energy industry. The study points out that within the next 12-15 years Romania's natural gas and oil resources will be completely exhausted, after which energy production will have to be based solely on water and lignite resources, which implies extremely high costs.

Funar's Right To Sign Documents Curbed

AU2303202395 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Mar 95 p 9

[Article by Vasile Selaru: "PUNR's Funar Will No Longer Have the Right To Sign Communiques Without the Assent of the Party's Executive Bureau"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The extraordinary meeting of the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] National Council was held in the conference rooms of the Brasov Aro Palace Hotel on 17 March 1995, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the party's establishment. Many PUNR parliamentarians and presidents of PUNR branches throughout the country, as well as PUNR President Gheorghe Funar, were present. Unfortunately, ROMANIA LIBERA's correspondents were denied access to the Extraordinary National Council proceedings. Nevertheless, we succeeded in learning that Mr. Funar's right to issue communiques without the previous assent of the PUNR Standing Bureau has been revoked. This act was supported by many party leaders. In his brief speech, Mr. Funar stated, among other things, that "the more than 50 Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality who attended the Cluj events have violated the law." However, he will try "to put in a good word for them so that they are not punished(?!)."

During the news conference that followed, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] was accused of, "together with the leadership of the Republic of Moldova, contributing to the act of destabilizing the national unity of Romanians." Likewise, the leaders claim that it was not accidental that on 15 March, the Romanian colors, along with the arms of the Republic of Moldova, were hoisted in Targu Secuiesc. Asked by correspondents about Ioan Stoica, the famous organizer of the Caritas crookedness, it was not Funar who answered but Ioan Gavra, who accused the Brasov intelligentsia and the inhabitants of Brasov of having set up Caritas. Proof of this (?!), Ioan Gavra said, is the fact that the trial is going to be held in Brasov...."

Manolescu's 'Open Letter' to Constantinescu

95P20583A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 27 Feb 95 p 1

[Article: "In an Open Letter, N. Manolescu Accuses E. Constantinescu of Committing a Number of Illegalities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC], Nicolae Manolescu, addressed the following open letter to the president of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]: "As you are probably aware, I have stated repeatedly since the meeting of the CDR Council on Friday, 17 February, that the PAC still hopes that the unity of the opposition can be preserved. We have been waiting for a gesture from you that would remove our fears that the modification of the protocol might have as its sole purpose the expulsion of certain groups, including the PAC, from the CDR. I was naive enough to believe you when you assured me, at a recent meeting, that no one really wants the PAC to leave the CDR.

Instead of the promised response, there was surprise that none of the parties that did not sign the still-unchanged protocol were invited to the meeting of the CDR Executive Council on 24 February. Your gesture is incomprehensible to me. The 17 February vote of the CDR Council obliges you to consider us CDR members with full rights—at least until the 30-day deadline expires. As long as we are in an alliance of independent parties (Article 3 of the protocol specifies this), any modification in the statute of the alliance must be approved by the leadership bodies of each party. By interpreting this condition tendentiously as a concession, you have committed the illegality of considering us to be excluded from the CDR. The statement you gave to ADEVARUL on Saturday is proof of this.

Mr. President, you bear the entire responsibility for this illegality. You are also responsible for all the illegal decisions made by an Executive Committee from whose meeting four of the 10 component groups were absent. Under these conditions, it seems almost futile for me to say that since you have violated an agreement which you, above all, were obliged to respect, you cannot lay claim to our confidence from now on. (...) Mr. President, I do not envy you the burden you bear on your shoulders."

Gen Divjak Doubts Cease-Fire Will Last

AU2303152495 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 95 pp 5-6

[Interview with Brigadier General Jovan Divjak, deputy commander in chief of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Nedzad Latic; place and date not given: "I Have Not Doubted It for One Moment: I Am on the Side of Good and Against Evil"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Latic] At the start of this interview, we would like to ask you: Where is Gen. Jovan Divjak today?

[Divjak] I am the deputy commander in chief in the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other than that, nothing has changed in the formation. Nor in my attitude towards what has been going on in the republic. Which means, I go to work with a lot of energy, emotion, and patriotism. And not for one second have I questioned whether I was on the right side. I am on the side of the good, against the evil.

[Latic] We met in the "faraway" year of 1992....

[Divjak] At that time, there were 18 percent of Croats and 11 percent of Serbs in the General Staff, and today there is 1 percent of each. Some left, others were moved to less-important positions. [passage omitted]

[Latic] Mirko Pejanovic, a member of the state Presidency, claims that 50 percent of the Serbs in Bosnia are against Karadzic....

[Divjak] That total also encompasses the Serbs who are in the Bosnian Army. It is a pleasure to listen to the commander of the 5th Motorized Brigade saying that there are 12 percent Serbs and 17 percent Croats in his brigade. For example, the battalion that defends Trg Heroja [Square of Heroes] has 17 percent Serbs, and the units of the Guards Brigade have 10 percent Serbs. In police units as well, for example in the Lasta unit, there a large number of soldiers of Serb nationality. [passage omitted]

[Latic] Are we today—on the seesaw between battle and politics—closer to the realization of radical goals?

[Divjak] There are no radical goals. There is just one, most important goal, and that is a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this stage of the war, it is possible for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to win back some important territories and facilities. When I talk to commanders, in response to my question of why we have not taken Doboj, they say that there would be no problem, if only we had enough artillery. If we have 40 howitzers in the Army, and you divide that number between the number of brigades, the quantity is inadequate.

[Latic] You are regarded as a highly qualified officer. However....

[Divjak] Unfortunately, in that respect, I have been very scantily used. I do not claim that things would change significantly. For example, had we remained where we were after we had taken the Grabez-Srbljani Plateau, Martic would not have joined battle on the Bihac front. But, when the units of the 5th Corps entered Croatia, Martic felt insecure. You see, the aggressor is trying to divide the free territory into two or three parts and to create enclaves, as they did in the Drina valley. Therefore I believe it is wrong to say that in this war we have found means and ways of fighting that enable us to change the situation to our own advantage without having heavy arms. Because, unfortunately, all the results have only been accomplished on the tactical level, but without changes on the strategic level. We had Trnovo, even Grebak, which we lost, and then took again. This means, those were failures in the previous conduct of military actions, and not a present success in taking the territories back. Many more people were killed in recapturing the territories that we had already had under our control.

[Latic] Do you believe this cease-fire to be feasible?

[Divjak] The Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted this only under pressure. Our problem was how to preserve the territories under the 5th Corps. The aggressor had used aviation and rocket systems to create another enclave. With the cease-fire, we are trying to save the population of that region and the territories. On the other hand, the Serb aggressor accepted the cease-fire because of other battlefields in Bosnia-Herzegovina. You know that we had some success at Vozuca and in the vicinity of Donji Vakuf, as well as at Crnorijecka Visoravan. But, although the aggressor agreed to the cease-fire quickly, they have not seriously maintained it. Therefore I do not think that this agreement has any future. Personally, I do not believe in any sort of cease-fire with Karadzic. We know that the Chetniks from Pale do not intend to agree to the Contact Group plan, because they would have to withdraw from the territories they have occupied....

[Latic] How would you comment on the two military agreements? One was signed in Belgrade, the other in Zagreb?

[Divjak] Russia has held to Milosevic and Karadzic from the very beginning. Before that, a meeting between the head of the general staff of the so-called Yugoslavia and the war criminal Krajisnik was held in Foca. So the Serbian-Russian agreement supports the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a military threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As for the agreement between the Croatian Army, our army, and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], I would, for the time being, describe it as an undefined document. Personally I believe that Croatia wants to have its back covered in case the war spreads. You see, when the Chetnik offensive on Bihac started, the Croatian Army could have easily recaptured its occupied territories. Susak, their defense minister, even said that they would help Bihac only after the Chetniks entered it. Nevertheless, I expect concrete cooperation on the terrain from the joint headquarters in the near future.

General Staff Commander Delic Views Situation

Meets UN Commander Smith

AU2303164695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff, held talks with General Rupert Smith, commander of UN forces for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Sarajevo today. The subject of discussion was the implementation of the agreement on cessation of hostilities.

During the talks, Army General Delic pointed to the problems connected to the nonobservation of agreements by the Serbian aggressor, which was especially characteristic for the area of Bihac, Tuzla, and Sarajevo, where the victims of the aggressor's activity are the civilians.

Army General Delic emphasized that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is strictly honoring the agreement signed, but that the agreement is pointless if the Serbian aggressor does not stop the combat in the theater of responsibility of the 5th Corps.

Similarly, it was demanded that UN representatives hold a meeting of the central joint commission in Bihac within 48 hours, at which Point 9 of the cease-fire agreement would be discussed, as well as the pace of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The reopening of Sarajevo Airport, the opening of the blue routes and their limitless use, as well as the cessation of combat on Mt. Igman and in the protected areas are the obligations that the Serbian aggressor and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] must fulfill in order to give purpose to the cease-fire agreement, Army General Rasim Delic emphasized at the end of today's talks.

Discusses Army Restructuring

AU2403095495 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 16, 17 Mar 95

[Interview in two installments with Army General Rasim Delic, chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Emir Habul and Sefko Hodzic; place and date not given: "War Is More Certain Than Peace"]

[Part I]

[FBIS Translated Text] [OSLOBODJENJE] The reason for this interview is the controversies and dilemmas that appeared after the Zagreb meeting regarding whether or not a joint command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Army, and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] had been founded. We asked General Delic about the result of the Zagreb meeting.

[Delic] In the search for a body that could unite military activities, we said in principle that there could be a joint staff with powers similar to those the Joint Staff that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO has. This means that it is not a joint command; a command is entitled to make decisions, whereas a joint staff is not. This is simply, as people would put it, a coordination body that would from one or from several places make proposals for the coordination of certain activities, but the decisionmaking would still remain within the structures of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croatian Army and the HVO. In other words, nothing was signed and consequently nothing could be authorized.

Strategic Importance

[Delic continues] As far as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is concerned, political authorization can only be given by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Supreme Commander. Apart from that, this coordination body, this joint staff, would have no superior or subordinate body. It would just enable us to agree on activities of interest to either the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army or the Croatian Army. Whether or not a joint body to facilitate these activities will be founded depends on politics. But, basically, this body does not prevent us from carrying out our activities.

[OSLOBODJENJE] What does this form of coordination mean from the point of view of strategy?

[Delic] Not very much. If the military potentials of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, are used according to a coordinated plan, the effects will be considerable, since plans will be made taking into consideration the time factor, the aims, and the possibilities. It is much better to deploy units in joint combat activities than to use single units at different times and in different places. In other words, we want to create a dense mass that might be more successful in opposing the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor than is the case now.

[OSLOBODJENJE] It seems that the Croatian and Muslim people welcomed this agreement. I heard that the inhabitants of Zagreb openly stated this during your walkabout after the talks?

[Delic] The people, ordinary citizens, first of all want to hear some good news, things that open up prospects for the future and enable a reasonable solution. This national agreement should have been made in 1992 at the beginning of the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina, instead of today. Perhaps even earlier....

Ready To Fight

[OSLOBODJENJE] Military analysts predict that war will break out again. What is your prognosis? Will the

Balkans "catch fire," as is feared by Western analysts, or will war be predominantly waged in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as is predicted by Gen. Spegelj?

[Delic] From today's perspective, we can say that the probability that the war will continue is great. It is greater than the chance of a just solution to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia after this truce, which is not being respected anyway. Therefore, it is realistic to expect that the war will continue. We are prepared for this option. It is difficult to predict what dimensions it will assume. I think that those who think that the war will spread throughout the Balkans are wrong. As a soldier, I would like this to happen, because it would take the pressure off the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor would be deployed over a larger territory and could no longer expect fresh supplies of both weapons and soldiers to be brought in from Serbia and Montenegro whenever necessary. I think that the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership will try to prevent the war from spreading to other areas because of their own limitations. Up to now they have always waged a limited war, first in Slovenia, then in Croatia, then in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the war in Croatia was interrupted, which resulted in it spreading in Bosnia. They might now want the opposite: an interruption of the war in Bosnia in order to complete their business in Croatia. In other words, it is not in their interest for combat to spread. It is certain that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to be an area in which most things will happen: Because the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor initiates combat activities even now and because the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is powerful and is cooperating with the HVO. On the other hand, the Serbian Krajina is being supplied through the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina will, unfortunately, remain affected by the war activities. You know that we have accepted the peace solutions proposed to us regardless of their inadequacy and unacceptability to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the other side did not. There will be no peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina or around it without a political solution. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is still ready to defend the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its nations.

Interruption of Training

[OSLOBODJENJE] You have very much discussed the development of the army lately. What is this qualitative leap all about?

[Delic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has grown over the last three years. The initial number of its soldiers was 17,000, as has been claimed by the president on several occasions. This number rose first to 50,000 and then to 200,000 soldiers. As far as the quality is concerned, there was much room, however, for improved internal cohesion within the units, for the development of a continuous command system, and for the training of soldiers, units, and commands. The period since the signing of the agreement about the cessation of hostilities on 31 December 1994 has been used to the maximum, principally for the training and internal reorganization of units. Both individuals and units, especially commanders, from that of a unit to that of a division, have been included in the training system. We have completed the process of transformation, we have a General Staff, which got its name during this process not only in the symbolic sense of the word. The obligations and duties, rights and powers of the General Staff, as the highest command body have been defined in a proper way. We have introduced a new institution, a new command, between the corps and the brigade level—the divisional command as an operative and tactical unit whose task it is to unite combat activities along a certain direction of an operation. This is a new quality in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. We have created a large number of rapid reaction brigades that do not have a theater of responsibility or combat area; they stand by in their barracks and can be deployed in any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Santic Case

[OSLOBODJENJE] The disappearance of Major General Vlado Santic [HVO commander in Bihac region, allegedly murdered] is becoming a political issue. A mixed investigating commission has been formed. What have you learnt about the case so far?

[Delic] I can say that there are no political or military problems in the institutions. This case does not reflect upon the relationship between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO. This is a personal problem, a settling of accounts. It happened on the night between 8 and 9 March, at approximately 0100. An argument broke out in the "Flamingo" restaurant after celebrations for International Women's Day, 8 March, in which some Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO members participated. After that there was an argument at the "Sedra" hotel. After this, Maj. Gen. Santic and a certain number of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members—it has been claimed that three were involved—left the hotel. These are isolated individuals and we cannot treat them as members of Bihac brigades. Santic has been missing since that time. There was some shooting and some people were wounded. These three members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have been arrested and the whole case is being investigated now. Investigating bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, of the 5th Corps, and of the HVO are working on the case. A number of meetings have been held in order to prevent the matter from taking on the dimensions of a national conflict or a conflict between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO, because it was only an incident. Unfortunately, Maj. Gen. Santic is a very temperamental man. He also had a drinking problem. And one cannot control oneself in an inebriated condition. His companions and those on the other side were not only drunk this time, but it had happened before. He had been involved in scenes not only with members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army but also with Croats and members of the HVO, so this incident is of a private nature and is related only to this man and to the people who were involved. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the General Staff, and I personally shall not allow such incidents in the future that could affect relations between the two nations. This is probably being interpreted in the same way by Croatian leaders. We have to implement the Federation and everything else we have begun. Therefore, we condemn such incidents and shall punish those who provoke them.

[Part II]

[FBIS Translated Text]

“5th Corps Is a Modern Army”

[OSLOBODJENJE] In yesterday's interview, Gen. Delic spoke about the military agreement between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Army, as well as about the chances for war or peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We resume the interview with the statement that 1994 was a special year regarding the tactical success of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Is the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army ready to carry out more complex operations now?

[Delic] It was our task to make the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army capable of performing more complex tactical operations. The units and commands are ready to carry out these now. I would like to mention again that we have been training commands at all levels, from corps commands to the divisional commands. This process, which will enable all units to carry out far more complex operations than now, is still going on. If we want to carry out certain important operations, however, other conditions must be fulfilled, too. It is unclear whether the official political bodies of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will follow us on those issues of which they are in charge: in connection with the logistical supply of the necessary quantities of technical materials, food, and fuel, for example.

It is unclear whether we shall be supported in solving the problems of our soldiers, whether the state and its institutions will start functioning, and whether they will be ready to support our fighting. The international community must also be ready to support us. You know that as soon as you start certain activities, there immediately appear certain international protagonists who require that a truce be set up, a cessation of hostilities; in other words, there are a series of other factors that do not have anything to do with the present capability of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, but that play a role in solving problems. This is a labyrinth, but compared with the time when the present truce was established, the Army of Bosnia- Herzegovina is now in any case capable of carrying out much more complex operations than before.

Enemy's Targets

[OSLOBODJENJE] There are those who do not believe that the Chetniks will agree to peace until they lose every hope that they can beat us. What is the present balance of power at the fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Delic] I think that they know that they cannot beat us any longer. Even if they ever had that hope, they must have lost it by now. I do not think that they have any illusions in that respect. Their problem is how to retain the areas that they have occupied. This is the problem that bothers them. Apart from that, they would like to make certain corrections in the field. Official military analysts no longer consider whether the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina might be defeated. What has to be asked now is whether the army is capable of making the change we discussed a moment ago and whether this will be allowed by the international community, because it first of all wants to maintain the status quo in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor, I can say that they still have the power and primarily good equipment. We have the advantage regarding soldiers. I do not mean only in terms of numbers; I am also thinking of morale, capability, and the internal organization of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is certain that the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors will insist on some of their goals and will launch offensives in certain areas. Apart from Bihac, primarily in eastern Bosnia.

Although the UN Protection Force and the international community have certain obligations, they will always try to prevent us, they will always be a counterbalance to our possible offensives. It is certain that the Serbs will continue to exert pressure on Sarajevo, regardless of the ultimata imposed by NATO and the international community. They will certainly try to make corrections in the Brcko corridor, since they still do not regard it as wide enough.

[OSLOBODJENJE] Bihac and the 5th Corps are a mystery to the international community. Whenever you leave the country, you are probably asked how long the defenses can endure and how it is possible that the 5th Corps has the strength to oppose the offensive on Bihac, which has already been going on for months.

Corps With Most Officers

[Delic] It has to be pointed out that the 5th Corps is organized according to all the military principles of a modern army. We are lucky that there were so many officers in the Bihac area when the 5th Corps was formed. This corps has the most officers with completed military education, which right from the start created conditions for very good organization. On the other hand, the mentality of the Krajina people also plays a role here. The Krajina population has always produced good soldiers. This is a general truth. It is a fortunate circumstance that there was enough time to train all the units and commands in the area primarily in 1992 and 1993. Still, the strength lies in these people. It lies in the system of their organization, command, and performance of duties. Although they are physically separated from us, they perform all the tasks that the General Staff requires of them. The General Staff has far more professionals, so that it can make a more professional analysis of every situation. They carry out all our suggestions and tasks. One thing is certain: We do not allow them to remain alone, especially not during the autumn offensive against the 5th Corps' theater of responsibility. We engaged forces all over that part of the front, so as to divert strong Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor forces to territories of other corps. We shall also do this in the future. It need not be published in the media that the 5th Corps will be helped whenever necessary and it is only natural for help to be provided. They fight in a different way; they plan and carry out combat activities in a specific way. They seldom defend themselves in the classical way. They are offensive in defending themselves. Therefore, we are sometimes accused of starting offensives in that area. It is normal that defense can be passive or active. The 5th Corps has opted for active defense and this has proven to be good so far.

[OSLOBODJENJE] What role did Santic and the HVO play in the defense of Bihac?

[Delic] From the military point of view, it was of minor importance. For several reasons. First of all, the Croatian population is not numerous in the Bihac region. The forces that the HVO formed there is insignificant compared with the total strength of the 5th Corps. In addition, the 5th Corps did not have any influence on the formation or strengthening of the internal HVO structure. It happened several times that members of their army abandoned the defense line. From the beginning of the war until the autumn offensive, the 5th Corps was unable to influence the HVO. Their forces did not even have the support of the HVO General Staff, since they were physically separated, so I think that they simply did not manage to organize themselves. This was also proven last autumn, when most of combat activities were aimed at Croatian villages situated south and southwest of Bihac. The danger to Bihac came from that side. Almost all of the Croatian villages were occupied and burnt down. It was only after 5th Corps units were engaged—naturally, the HVO was also involved in this—that this area was liberated. I would like to point again that the HVO units in that area are so small that they cannot significantly influence the situation on the front. The political importance of our joint actions is enormous, however, because it reflects relations between the Muslim and the Croatian nation. Relations between our armies have to be cherished, because they influence all kind of relations between the Muslim and the Croatian nations.

Religion Does Not Determine Status

[OSLOBODJENJE] Has the General Staff taken part in the discussion about the introduction of ideology and religion into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army?

[Delic] I think that this statement is wrong, which is why the General Staff responded. Generally speaking, we do not respond to such things, but in all armies of the world that want to be democratic, religion is allowed. Religion is a private matter of every individual. In many armies there are not only religious institutions, but there are also chaplains in the highest tactical units. Why should this not be the case with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? I think that our decision to introduce religion into the army was correct. We have officers who help organize religious services, which is a part of their professional duties. Nobody is forced to attend religious services, nobody can be forced to be religious, nor are religious people or atheists privileged. The position that a soldier has is exclusively determined on the basis of his professional and personal qualities. Therefore we cannot speak about ideology in the army. In times of war, religion always attracts more followers than normally: People come back to religion, to their roots. I would say that our people are searching for their spiritual roots in religion. They find additional motives for their struggle in religion. It is very important for us to motivate the people in this way for the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[OSLOBODJENJE] Something about the relations toward the UN Protection Force. Has anything changed since Rose left and Smith took over?

[Delic] This is a matter of principle. I am not pleased when they do not fulfill their obligations, regardless of who their head is. This means that I shall talk to General Smith as I talked to General Rose. If they fulfill the obligations, relations will be correct. If they do not, our personal relations will be correct, and official relations will be formal.

Meets Iranian Ambassador

AU2303195495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Rasim Delic received Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian today.

Ambassador Taherian was interested in a certain number of questions that are significance for the understanding of the current situation in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the views of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army about the realization of the cease-fire agreement.

Ambassador Taherian was presented with numerous indicators that indicate that the Serbian aggressors have never honored the cease-fire agreement they signed. The enemy is attacking Bihac daily; he is shelling other civilian targets; he would not allow the opening of blue routes for humanitarian convoys; and he is firing at the Igman road, Sarajevo airport, and the UN safe havens.

Gen. Delic emphasized that, despite the aggressor's constant cease-fire violations, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army still honors the cease-fire agreement and is determined for a peace process and a just solution of the war clashes on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina without the use of force.

At the end of a cordial meeting, Gen. Delic thanked the people of Iran for the aid that they are providing for the just struggle of the people of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

'Full' Diplomatic Ties to South Africa

AU2403122295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has established full diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa.

The signing ceremony was conducted by permanent representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of South Africa in the United Nations, Ambassadors Sacirbegovic and [words indistinct], in the South African mission with the United Nations in New York.

The protocol was signed yesterday, while the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries has been made official today.

Airlift to Sarajevo Resumes; 14 Flights Planned

AU2403085895 Paris AFP in English 0836 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 24 (AFP)—The humanitarian air lift into Sarajevo, interrupted for nearly three weeks after planes were fired at, resumed Friday morning, UN officials at the airport said.

A total of 14 flights operated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugeees were programmed from Ancona, Italy, with relief aid for the besieged city, UN Protection Force spokesman Major Pierre Chavancy said.

Two International Committee of the Red Cross flights were also due in from Zagreb, along with one UNPROFOR flight from the same city, the spokesman said.

A first C-130 Hercules landed and took off again without hitch Friday morning under snow flurries.

The resumption of air the aid operations follows verbal undertakings by the government and Bosnian Serbs not to fire at aircraft landing at Sarajevo airport, UN officials said.

A number of UN planes came under fire at the airport recently, prompting a suspension of the UNHCR operation into the city.

Firing then continued against UNPROFOR planes, including one carrying UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi 12 days ago. An ICRC plane was also hit by gunfire, the first since the beginning of the war three years ago.

2d Corps Inflicts 'Serious Defeat' on Majevica

AU2403120695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 95

[Report by Salih Brkic from Tuzla]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The totally unprovoked attacks by the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor that started on Monday [20 March] with the shelling of Tuzla and artillery-infantry attacks on the defense lines of the 2d Corps in the region of Mt. Majevica, have continued with unabated ferocity for the fifth day in a row. Residential areas have also been targeted, particularly the protected zone of Tuzla, which was again shelled with five howitzer and gun shells last night.

The fighters and officers of the 24th and 25th Division, and particularly of the Chivalrous Mehid Malkic Brigade, have for the fifth day been waging heroic battles against the Serbian-Montenegrin fascist phalanx. In hand-to-hand combat characteristic of many clashes on the slopes of Mt. Majevica, the members of the 2d Corps are displaying great courage and military discipline.

The enemy has suffered, in the fierce fighting, one of the worst defeats since the beginning of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In five-day-long clashes, the heroes of the 2d Corps have liquidated over 160 of the aggressor's soldiers and wounded hundreds; several dozen have been either captured or have surrendered to our fighters. This has been reported today by the 2d Corps Information Service.

The serious defeat on the Mt. Majevica front has wreaked chaos in the units of the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor. Entire units of Karadzic's and Milosevic's soldiers have been deserting the Mt. Majevica front, which has become one of the biggest Serbian fascist graves. [passage omitted]

3d Corps Reports Cease-Fire Violations

AU2403094095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 24 Mar 95

[Report by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps Press Center]

[FBIS Translated Text] The enemy violated the cease-fire on all 3d Corps theater of operations fronts yesterday. The aggressor shelled our positions on the Zavidovici-Vozuca front with mortars and howitzers, and the Maglaj front with Bofors guns and antiaircraft guns. The aggressor shelled the area of Bezimeni Vis with howitzers; enemy small arms fire was constant.

The situation was identical on the Serici-Teslic front, where the aggressor engaged in sporadic artillery fire.

Serbs 'Intensified' Attacks, Say 7th Corps

AU2403120995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 95

[Report by the Press Center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 7th Corps]

[FBIS Translated Text] The aggressor's attacks on all defense lines in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 7th Corps theater of operations have continued today. The intensity of the Chetnik attacks is at its worst on the Mt. Vlasic front, where—launching combined artillery and infantry attacks—they are trying to move our defense line. The fighters of the 7th Corps have survived a real cannonade of artillery missiles, from mortar to howitzer shells, without suffering a single casualty.

At the same time as the attacks on the Mt. Vlasic front, the aggressor has intensified his attacks on the Bugojno and Turbe parts of the front. All day the Chetniks have been firing with mortars of all calibers at our soldiers' defense lines.

That the Chetniks are not only targeting the defense lines is illustrated by the fact that general alarms are in force in Travnik and Bugojno, owing to sporadic and indiscriminate shelling from Chetnik tanks and howitzers.

Still, regardless of the intensity of the Chetnik attacks, the fighters of the corps that knows no defeat are holding the defense lines firmly under control.

Heavy Fighting Continues on Vlasic Front

LD2303215995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2110 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—The press center of the 1st Krajina Corps reported this evening that savage battles have continued on the Vlasic front where the Muslim offensive is in its fourth day.

Units of the Muslim Travnik and Zenica Corps are violently attacking Serb defensive positions in the region around Babanovac, Devecani, and Galica.

The statement does not specify the number of casualties, but it is assumed that both sides suffered losses.

Over a thousand Serb women, children, and elderly people have fled the Muslim attacks leaving their villages in the Vlasic area and seeking accommodation in Knezevo [Skender Vakuf].

The same source says that today the Muslims also carried out offensive actions on the Trebava, Doboj, Srbobran, Ozren, Kupres, and Majevica fronts.

5th Corps: Bihac Front 'Generally Quiet'

AU2403104495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 24 Mar 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning has been generally quiet in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps theater of operations, except for the Velika Kladusa front. There the enemy has engaged in intense artillery and small arms provocations. Following yesterday's failure in the fighting around Radakovici and (Stojica Selo), the joint aggressors and paramilitary Velika Kladusa formations have continued to amass their units along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the area of (?Trzacka Rasela) to Velika Kladusa.

Around the protected zone of Bihac, the enemy has concentrated troops in Ripac, Lohovska Brda, Melinovac, and part of Mt. Pljesivica toward Zeljezno Polje in the UN Protected Area, and has been shelling the forward defense lines of the 5th Corps and the outskirts of the Bihac municipality sporadically. At the same time, there has been sniper and small arms fire.

As for the other fronts, Bosanska Krupa in particular, there have been a few explosions in addition to small arms fire; the situation on the Grmusa-Srbljani Plateau and Grabez Heights has been somewhat calmer, with abated enemy artillery and sniper fire.

Owen, Stoltenberg, 'RSK' Official Hold Talks

LD2303172795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1653 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, the cochairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, had a meeting in Belgrade today with Borislav Mikelic, the prime minister of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK].

The talks were held behind closed doors, and, judging by Stoltenberg and Mikelic's sttements, the main topic of discussion was the future of the UN protection peace forces in the so-called UN Protected Areas in Serb Krajinas.

Both Stoltenberg and Mikelic made very short statements. Stoltenberg stressed the importance of continuing the peace process between Knin and Zagreb. Mikelic stressed the importance of the Vance plan on the basis of which the problems between the RSK and Croatia should be solved. [passage omitted]

Stoltenberg, Officials Comment

AU2303205095 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Mar 95

[Interview with Thorvald Stoltenberg, chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic, and RSK Assembly Chairman Rajko Lezajic by Danijela Popovic in Belgrade on 23 March—recorded, Stoltenberg speaks in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popovic] Mr. Stoltenberg, is there any news concerning the peace process?

[Stoltenberg] The process is, in fact, under way. We are constantly exchanging views and I feel and believe that as long as we are negotiating, we are moving forward in the right direction. This is the basic thing—without that, the process would certainly come to a halt.

[Popovic] Mr. Mikelic, what is your reaction following this new round of negotiations?

[Mikelic] First, I would like to say that we held talks today with Messrs. Stoltenberg and Owen who, according to our deep conviction—both mine and Assembly President Lezajic's—are the most deserving, that last year we established something I would call a high-quality peace between Croatia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], that we reached a peace agreement on a cease-fire, that we continued economic negotiations, and that the realization of both the highway and oil pipeline has been developing very well and that the one interruption that occurred was certainly not caused by us. It was Croatia who caused the interruption. We are now seeking possibilities, a model on how to resume all this—that is, both the economic and political talks. It is our opinion that the present UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate, the Vance plan, served as a guarantee for the first, second, and even third stage, and that the political talks should be continued on that principle. We shall see if the international community acknowledges this, and if these questions we talked about and the situation in Krajina can be developed further in a good way, and if there will be no tensions and new war options.

[Lezajic] We in the RSK are united on this issue: that this present UNPROFOR mandate should not be changed and that one should continue to follow this mandate.

[Popovic] Therefore, the RSK's stand has not changed.

[Lezajic] Well, it is unchanged because this UNPROFOR mandate suits both the Croatian side and the Serbian side, even more so as this mandate was adopted thanks to the consent of the Serbian, Croatian, and Yugoslav sides.

[Popovic] Thank you very much.

[Lezajic] Thank you.

First Day of Silajdzic-Valentic Talks Summarized

AU2303201995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Official two-day talks between the delegations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian Governments headed by Prime Ministers Haris Silajdzic and Nikica Valentic started in the Croatian capital this afternoon. Nedzad Leko reports:

[Begin recording] All open issues from the earlier agreements were discussed during the three-hour talks. The main topics were: Economic cooperation, payment operations, and customs policy. Cooperation in railway, road, and air traffic was also the subject of talks. The regulation of mutual property and legal relations, the return of refugees, agreement on social insurance and cooperation in social activities were also on the agenda.

The talks ended shortly before 1900 [1800 GMT] and we have learned that they first discussed visas and refugees. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation particularly insisted on the resolution of the issue of transit visas though Croatia to facilitate the return to Bosnia-Herzegovina of all refugees in other countries who wish to do so.

Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Mater Granic left the talks a little earlier to participate in the work of the Sabor. He told to the reporters briefly that the talks were conducted in a good atmosphere. The participants in the talks disclosed no details about the talks to the reporters, but Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic announced the signing of certain agreements tomorrow.

Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic held a dinner for the Bosnia-Herzegovina guests. It is scheduled that the talks of the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina Government delegations will continue tomorrow morning. [passage omitted]

Talks Continue

LD2403131195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina prime ministers resumed in Zagreb this morning. They were scheduled to end this morning, but journalists were informed that the talks will continue this afternoon. Andjelko Perincic has more details:

[Perincic] The two-day meeting between the heads of the two governments began behind closed doors yesterday and, according to the official schedule, it was to be completed this morning. Around 20 Croatian and foreign journalists waited for statements from the two prime ministers—Nikica Valentic and Haris Silajdzic. However, after a long wait, the journalists were addressed only by the Croatian prime minister:

[Begin Valentic recording] We are discussing very serious topics, concerning mainly economic relations. Since we are preparing several agreements on very sensitive economic issues, which also have political relevance, we agreed to resume the talks at 1330 today. This is all I can tell you for the time being. [end recording]

We can expect more details about this very important meeting later today.

Tudjman, Stoltenberg Discuss UN, Peace Process

LD2303233695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has received cochairman of the Geneva conference, Thorvald Stoltenberg, in the Presidential Palace. Also present were head of the president's office Hrvoje Sarinic, Miomir Zuzul, the president's special envoy and ambassador to the United Nations, presidential adviser Zeljko Matic, Kai Eide, ambassador attached to the Geneva conference, Vesna Skare-Ozbolt, assistant to the head of the president's office, and Stoltenberg's adviser Bertie Racharan.

The discussion focused on new UN forces and the resumption of the peace process in Croatia. President Tudjman said there was no departure from the well-known Croatian stand on the new mandate of the international forces, which the president outlined during his talks in Copenhagen, Washington, and New York.

The president stressed that Croatia favors a peaceful reintegration of Croatia's temporarily occupied areas and greeted the continuation in the near future of the implementation of the 2 Decemmber 1994 agreement with Croatian Serbs.

Stoltenberg Comments

LD2303235695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prior to leaving the presidential palace Thorvald Stoltenberg gave a brief statement for the journalists. Andjelko Perincic reports:

[Perincic] The peace envoy representing the United Nations gave the following statement to journalists:

[Begin Stoltenberg recording in English fading into Perincic report in Serbo-Croatian] This is a part of my consultation process. I travel and talk to people about the new mandate of UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia. On the basis of the information I obtained, I will soon send a report to the UN secretary general and he will use it as a basis for his report to the UN Security Council and for the UN Security Council resolution on the renewal of the UN mandate in Croatia.

I believe there are sufficient grounds on all sides for the continuation of the peace process and the establishment of a new mandate. However, this is just the first step, the beginning. Views are becoming closer, especially concerning the new mandate.

When asked where cochairman Owen was, Stoltenber said his colleague stayed in Belgrade and had talks with Americans, without specifying which Americans.

Both cochairmen had talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade and with Borislav Mikelic, one of the Knin leaders, and in Zvornik with Radovan Karadzic, the leader of Bosnian Serb rebels.

Commentary Looks at Izetbegovic's Bonn Visit

AU2403113895 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 95 p 7

[Commentary by Nenad Ivankovic: "No Croats or Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are indications that the Americans have recently begun to realize that they made a mistake in neglecting the Bosnian Federation. For a year Washington did practically nothing to encourage or support the implementation of the Federation. The Clinton Administration concentrated on the overall solution to the Bosnian crisis and prepared to support the Federation more seriously only after that. In the meantime, it has transpired that there will be no integral solution, because Milosevic has deceived the West with his phoney blockade on the Drina River. At the same time, the Federation has been quite shaken.

This is why in the past several weeks both Washington and Bonn have been rushing to save and consolidate the Federation, which is now seen as the only ground on which the Contact Group peace plan still stands. Therefore, the Federation is a kind of alpha and omega for the resolution of the Bosnian issue.

Since the meeting in Munich, the negotiations at Petersberg near Bonn, and the topical talks in Washington, including Izetbegovic's visit to Bonn, intensive efforts have been made to maintain and consolidate solidarity among the victims of the Serbian aggression and implement the Federation Constitution as far as possible.

It is along these lines that the "new" Washington policy on the Balkans has been announced, which would, on the one hand, boil down to "stronger support for the Federation," and on the other to a firmer attitude toward Belgrade. Within this framework, U.S. diplomats have been announcing that they will be seeking from the Security Council to have the sanctions currently suspended against Serbia until 22 April reimposed.

Izetbegovic's visit to Bonn (on 16 and 17 March) was also marked by such a hurried support for the Federation, at least from the German side. It is clear: If the Federation falls apart, then not a single letter would remain of the Contact Group peace plan. Bosnia would descend into total war and chaos, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] would have to leave, and the West, through NATO, would have to go in. This is the worst case scenario for the United States and Germany, since both would then have to become militarily involved there.

1. Izetbegovic was received in Bonn as a "moderate" Muslim with whom the West can build its Bosnian plans and in whom it can put its trust. However, to judge from what Izetbegovic said to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and particularly from the way he presented his priorities, it is hard to say whether the cooperation will be crowned with a joint success.

Izetbegovic's speech to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Commitee was certainly presented as the high point of his visit to Bonn. Kinkel had previously announced that he would see to it that Izetbegovic came to Bonn and addressed that body on "the suffering of his people."

However, to judge from what Izetbegovic did say to that body, it is unclear what his priorities are. Is he committed to the preservation of (the old) Bosnia-Herzegovina, which no longer exists as the Serbs long ago buried it, or a federal Bosnia as the new model of coexistence of the Bosnian peoples, which he failed to mention in his address.

2. Federation is a word Izetbegovic obviously has difficulty uttering. In the statement on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included his view of the solution to the problem, Izetbegovic did not even mention the Federation. Moreover, he did not mention the Croats either; he only talked about the Serbs, as the aggressors.

The fact that he did not answer a question about the Federation that Gansel, a Social Democrat deputy, asked him after his speech, indicates how persistent the Bosnian president was. A Greens deputy (Poppe) also asked about the Federation, but Izetbegovic also disregarded that question. Only when the liberal Irmer asked the question for the third time did the Bosnian president find it appropriate to say the following:

"I believe that the Federation will hold out, even though it has stagnated over the past year. We believe there are several power centers on the Croatian side that paralyze one another. There is resistance there, since the Federation means the end of the Herzeg-Bosnia parastate. They have therefore been slowing down the process of the Federation coming to life in order to keep Herzeg-Bosnia alive for as long as possible. The Petersberg agreement is a step forward, but since yesterday there have been new signs of obstructions, as the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] has come up with a 25-percent transport tariff, so they are no longer letting convoys pass through their territory!"

However, the Petersberg agreement between Zubak and Ganic has shown that the problems are of a somewhat different nature, which is that the Croats are prepared to abolish the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia the moment the institutions of the Federation authorities are established, which means when the Federation is built up—from its municipalities, through its cantons, to the government and ministries. However, this process also includes (as was expressly stated in the Petersberg agreement) the abolition of the institutions of the authorities of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. Izetbegovic's statement, nevertheless, indicates that Sarajevo wishes to preserve the present republican authority, and abolish only Herzeg-Bosnia, even before the Federation is established. With this the Muslims would politically completely marginalize the Croats as an entity and keep the "civic Bosnia" option open.

That Izetbegovic was not being fair to the Croats in this was also evident in his remark on "yesterday's blockade on the part of the HVO." It appeared that the Croats were doing this for no particular reason except that they want to violate the Petersberg agreement. This one-sided presentation was, fortunately, corrected the same day by German ARD television and we should hope that the deputies watched it afterward. Reporting on the Croatian blockade, it said that it was in fact a response to the kidnapping and probable murder of the General Vlado Santic, HVO chief of staff [in Bihac region], which had obviously been by the Bosnian Muslims. Moreover, if we are to discuss who is violating the Peterburg agreement, then the kidnapping of Santic was certainly a first response to the agreement between Zubak and Ganic.

However, Izetbegovic finds the entire Federation affair quite difficult, which was indicated by the fact that his Foreign Minister Ljubijankic had to remind him in front of everybody, as could be heard over the microphone: "Go on, say that you support the Petersberg agreement!" Izetbegovic then did so.

3. Refugees are another example of Izetbegovic's understanding of the Federation's implementation. He complained that the Croats were preventing the return of refugees to their homes. However, it was precisely the Petersberg agreement that showed that solving issue of the return of refugees will be possible only when the Federation institutions are established. This is why it was set to one side that in the mixed cantons (the central Bosnian and Neretva cantons) the prewar demographic structure of the population must be observed, which the Muslims would not agree to until now. After all, this is one of the most difficult problems in Mostar, where there are about 30,000 refugees from eastern Herzegovina.

Vares is a classic example of why the return of the refugees is not possible before the Federation is established at all levels and in all its forms. The Croats won the elections in Vares, but power is at present still in the hands of the Muslims, since they "conquered" Vares at a certain point. Croats are not returning because they do not trust those who expelled them from Vares and they certainly will not return until there is a Croatian mayor there, which again is a matter of bringing the Federation Constitution to life and implementing it. In that respect, the return of the refugees has also been made impossible by such blockades on the Muslims' part, as well as by attempts to legalize—so to speak—the demographic structure of the population in the mixed cantons, which would, for the Croats, effectively mean the beginning of their end in the Federation.

4. The insistence on maintaining the Croat-Muslim status quo becomes most clearly prominent in the issue of the joint army. Federation President Kresimir Zubak has expressed on several occasions the readiness of the Croatian side to establish a joint Federation Army. However, the Muslim side has been refusing this proposal, because it wants to keep its army, that is, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Ganic recently explained this to the Germans thus: Parts of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO would merge, thus creating the Federation Army, and, in addition, there would still be the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija Izetbegovic would certainly still be the supreme commander of the latter. The desire to preserve the "Muslim army," and at the same time drown the HVO in the (other) joint army indicates that the Muslims have not given up their earlier political aims and at the same time gives rise to the suspicion that they see the Federation only as the transient form in the struggle for a "civic Bosnia."

It is completely clear that, if one army were to be made out of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO, with a joint command, then its supreme commanders would be Zubak and Ganic. Second, it would be the most prominent sign that the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia have the same and joint political aims, and third and most importantly, all the problems that are at present preventing bringing the federation to life would quickly be resolved. To judge from the statements of the Croatian representatives, they are prepared to join such an army but they are not prepared to drown the HVO in a federation army that would in a way be subordinated to Alija Izetbegovic's army. This is why the issue of the joint army was resolved with the Petersberg agreement.

Izetbegovic showed that this was the case to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. Speaking about the resistance to the Serbian aggressor since the beginning of the war (6 April 1993), he only talked about his army, which, according to him, at present consists of 200,000 men under arms, but he did not even mention either the Croats or their participation in the defense of Bosnia.

5. So what is Izetbegovic's aim? In his statement he presented it in this way: "Our aim is an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina within its existing borders, a democratic country. The second aim is a multicultural Bosnia."

The Bosnian president, naturally, did not at all mention the Federation in the sense of a new model for the coexistence of the Bosnian peoples, nor did he mention that in this integral Bosnia-Herzegovina of his the peoples would have to be guaranteed complete equality. Instead, he spoke about "our people," implying entire Bosnia. Therefore, he used the term "people" in the singular form. This bears a striking similarity to the Yugo-Communist expression "our people" (also in the singular form), which at the time was no mistake or lapse, but an expression of the constitutional aspirations of Belgrade regarding what the Yugoslavia of the time should be.

For all these reasons it is completely understandable that Izetbegovic did not even mention confederation with Croatia, either. Zagreb keeps emphasizing how attached it is to the Washington Agreement, and, in that respect, to the part relating to the confederation of Croatia and the Bosnian Federation. Never mind how realistic and desirable such a confederation between Croatia and the Bosnian Federation is. These are the facts.

Izetbegovic mentioned the Federation in Bonn only when he was forced to, so to speak. He completely forgot about the confederation, which complies with his formulation that the main aim of the "struggle of our people is an integral and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina." This definition is not only a problem because of the situation in Bosnia and the sensitivity of the peoples there (particularly the Croats) to any sort of majority takeover, but also because there are still many democratic countries in Europe in which national problems are not at all resolved through this. Turkey is basically also a democratic country, but what good does that do the Kurds?

Finance Ministry Restricts Currency Outflow

95BA0196C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
25 Feb 95 p 1

[Public notice by Finance Ministry: "No More Than 2,000 Kunas To Be Carried Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—It has recently been noted that when citizens of the Republic of Croatia travel abroad they carry more than the allowed amounts of domestic and foreign currency, and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia therefore apprises the public of the statutes in effect with respect to foreign exchange transactions.

Citizens of the Republic of Croatia traveling abroad may carry out of the Republic of Croatia foreign currencies in an amount not to exceed 1,000 German marks [DM], and in addition to that amount they may carry foreign currencies in an amount not to exceed another DM2,000 upon presentation of evidence that they withdrew the foreign exchange from their foreign exchange account or foreign exchange savings account or purchased it from an authorized bank. That document is valid for one trip and for a period up to 90 days from the date of issuance. In international passenger traffic, they may carry out of the Republic of Croatia kunas in an amount not to exceed 2,000 kunas per person, and the same amount may be carried into the Republic of Croatia.

A traveler who at the border crossing declares to the authorized customs official that he is carrying domestic or foreign currency in excess of the allowed amount, or if he does not have the necessary documentation to carry the currency, may deposit the amount that exceeds the allowed amount in an authorized bank or the customhouse itself. The foreign and domestic currency deposited will be returned to the traveler upon his return to the Republic of Croatia, but if the traveler or his authorized representative does not withdraw the currency within 60 days it shall be assumed that he has renounced it on behalf of the budget of the Republic of Croatia. If the traveler does not declare that he is carrying domestic or foreign currency in excess of the allowed amount, the authorized customs official shall, upon issuing a receipt, confiscate the amounts of foreign or domestic currency exceeding the allowed amount, and shall at the same time file a request with the Foreign Exchange Inspectorate of the Republic of Croatia for misdemeanor proceedings to be instituted. In addition to a fine, in misdemeanor proceedings the Foreign Exchange Inspectorate shall pronounce the measure of permanent confiscation of the domestic and foreign currency as the object of the misdemeanor on behalf of revenues of the state budget of the Republic of Croatia.

We call to the attention of citizens that they have no need to carry sizable amounts of foreign exchange in traveling abroad because they may make payments abroad for goods and services they are importing through their foreign exchange accounts kept in authorized banks in the Republic of Croatia.

The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia also advises citizens to purchase and sell foreign exchange in authorized banks and currency exchange offices, and likewise not to make or receive payments in foreign exchange in the Republic of Croatia, states the news release of the Finance Ministry.

FM Crvenkovski on Talks With Perry on Troops

AU2303203995 Skopje MIC in English 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "We had a meeting with the mediator of the UN Cyrus Vance, last Friday. However, the date for a direct Macedonian-Greek meeting has still not been set. In principle, our position, from the very beginning of the dispute, has been known. We have always been for direct negotiations, because we feel it is normal for two neighboring countries to sit down and equally, face to face, discuss all open problems," stated Foreign Minister Crvenkovski, following his return from the several day visit to New York, Washington, and Paris.

"We believe that in order to have a joint meeting, first all the preparations have to be completed for it to give a certain result. Therefore, I believe that at this moment it is much to early, due to a number of reasons, to prognose such a meeting, and the date has also not been fixed," Crvenkovski said.

"I believe that the contacts with Cyrus Vance will continue, and if and how things continue to develop and how much we will be able to come to objective and realistic conditions for equal dialogue, we will see."

In response to the question whether Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] has promised to change the flag and, for the Greeks, controversial article in the Constitution, in exchange for the lifting of the embargo and the quick opening of a U.S. Embassy in Skopje, Minister Crvenkovski said: "No, that is not correct at all, we haven't made any promises, nor was that discussed. It's logical that such news can not have a realistic basis, because we clearly said that we do not accept for the embargo to be the subject of any kind of negotiations, nor are we prepared to give anything in exchange for the lifting of the embargo. More so, because even 13 months from its implementation, it is apparent that the embargo can not achieve the effects that the other side expected. The Republic of Macedonia is a much better organized state, than some people assumed."

In relation to the meeting with the U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and whether the increase in the number of U.S. soldiers in Macedonia was discussed, the minister said: "We had a long, very good and sincere discussion with William Perry, on a number of issues. The talks concentrated mainly on the role of the peacekeeping forces on our territory, the separation of the mandate of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], foremost due to the success of the mission and its different character from all UN missions conducted so far, and we also assessed that no concrete actions are foreseen at this moment for expansion of the number of the troops. However, the question should remain open, in case of certain changes of the situation in the whole region."

TANJUG on Skopje's UN Mandate

LD2403145795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1422 GMT 24 Mar 95

[By Mladen Stancic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, March 24 (TANJUG)-—President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] Kiro Gligorov uses every opportunity to tell international officials that the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] is vital not only for the FYROM's but also for the region's security and safety.

Moreover, ever since UNPROFOR was deployed in the republic, mainly along its border with Yugoslavia, top FYROM officials have been dissatisfied with what they call UNPROFOR's 'subsidiary' role.

Former FYROM Defense Minister Vlado Popovski said earlier that, 'it is impermissible that (FYRO) Macedonia should be treated the same way as Bosnia and Croatia, and that it should remain within the joint U.N. mission in the former Yugoslavia.'

While in New York last week, FYROM Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski urged U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali that the mandate of U.N. peacekeepers in the FYROM be redefined.

Skopje insists that the UNPROFOR command in the republic be detached from the joint headquarters in Zagreb and that separate military, logistic and administrative structures of the U.N. mission be set up, which would require appointments of a separate commander and a special U.N. envoy for the FYROM.

Encouraged by an announcement that the name of the UNPROFOR mission in Croatia might be changed into the U.N. Force in Croatia (UNFIC), Skopje expects the name of the UNPROFOR mission in the republic to be changed into the U.N. Force in Macedonia (UNFIM).

According to FYROM pro-government press, through changes in the UNPROFOR name and mandate, the FYROM would finally act in the United Nations as a separate state in which UNPROFOR would have a completely different mission and mandate.

It is expected to become clear next month whether a redefined UNPROFOR mandate would also mean a stronger peacekeeping force in the FYROM, especially after the Pentagon announced that a considerably stronger U.S. force could be deployed in the republic.

In addition to its concern for a stable, but separate activity of 'its' peacekeepers, the FYROM had plunged into the implementation of the memorandum on FYROM-U.S. military cooperation, signed in Skopje in November, 1994.

Experts of the U.S. Army liaison team have already arrived in Skopje, while another memorandum, concerning concrete ways of their military cooperation, is to be signed as soon as April 1.

The FYROM has evidently been granted the status of informal participant in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.

Furthermore, the FYROM is preoccupied with a promotion of military cooperation with its 'traditional friend' Turkey. a ranking FYROM delegation has recently returned from Turkey, while the chief of the Turkish Army staff is due in Skopje soon.

PDP's Haliti on Decision To Return to Assembly

AU2403120795 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 21 Mar 95 p 6

[Article by Fiqiri Sejdiaj: "Within or Outside the System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Albanian deputies have returned to the parliament.

After the irrevocable resignation of Mr. Abdurrahman Haliti, the deputy chairman of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] parliament and chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP], the Albanian deputies walked out of the parliamentary chamber.

The speech in Albanian to parliament made by deputy Hysen Ramadani, followed by the harsh reaction of the Macedonian deputies, and the opening of the university, followed by the harsh response of the police, provided the Albanians with indisputable arguments for not taking part in the Macedonia Assembly until the Macedonian side responded positively to their demands.

But what specifically were the Albanian deputies and the Albanian population in Macedonia demanding?

Briefly, they were demanding the use of the Albanian language alongside Macedonian, higher education in Albanian, and broader responsibilities in local government.

It required the intervention of the representatives of international organizations, including Mr. Ahrens, to persuade the two sides, Albanian and Macedonian, that dialogue, consensus, and tolerance are the way to establish peace, understanding, and interethnic harmony.

However, while the PDP deputies led by Abdurrahman Haliti returned to parliament, the PDP's other wing led by Arber Xhaferi still refused to enter the parliamentary chamber. How can this be explained, when Xhaferi called the meeting between his group and Mr. Ahrens an historic encounter?

The crux of the matter is whether to solve problems within or outside the system.

Arber Xhaferi has declared in a more or less categorical fashion, "If Skopje does not grant our demands, we ourselves will create our own institutions." There is thus talk of solving problems outside the system. This group's representatives and supporters go even further. "Gligorov's socialist Macedonia is not a democratic state. Communists head the Macedonian Government," etc.

But what is the path favored by the other wing led by Abdurrahman Haliti, which represents the largest party of Albanians in Macedonia and, as a result, has the largest number of deputies in the Macedonian parliament?

Abdurrahman Haliti states, "There is no dilemma, because we as a party have determined that we will exercise and defend the civil and national rights and freedoms of the Albanians through the system. We want to avoid coercion, improvisation, and street politics. We have no need to impose on the population, our members and supporters, situations that neither they nor anybody else want. We do not promise the earth. We do not make pathetic cries of 'Oh my beloved Albania.' No! We offer realistic solutions for the Albanian population of Macedonia, through democratic means and within the system. We show the way forward and what the best path is. We do not want the people to take to the streets, but to become aware of the rights that they must gain step by step, without resting for a moment from the struggle within the system. Macedonia does not belong only to the Macedonians, but also to the Albanians and other nationalities. We are participating in the government because that is how we will best and most quickly achieve our demands. We are participating in parliament and will be the opposition in this parliament when any particular bill leaves the Albanians to one side or, worse, tramples them underfoot.

"It is ridiculous to think that we are not working for the Albanians because we are taking part in the government.

"Tell me how you can work for the Albanians outside the government, outside parliament, and outside the central and local administration.

"If we are accused of being progovernment because we are taking part in the government, I say again that this is ridiculous. It is one thing to take part in a government and another to be progovernment. These are two entirely different things. How can the Albanians remain outside the government of a state in which they are both present and active? How can they discover and prevent government decisions that are against their interests?

"The PDP's decision to take part in the government and now most recently in the parliament is not greed for personal power but arises out of a need to govern together a country in which we live and work together. We think that we can only advance the position of the Albanians living in Macedonia within the system.

"The Tirana government, ATA, and Albanian Radio-Television are making this dilemma still more difficult by openly supporting one wing, that of Arber Xhaferi. Does the Tirana government favor a struggle outside the system?

"It is hard to believe, but Albanian Radio-Television and the repeated meetings with only one wing are discrediting Tirana not only in the eyes of the Albanians living in Macedonia, but elsewhere, too."

Within or outside the system? These are two quite contrary paths which, after a brief lull, appear to be setting the Albanian political parties in Macedonia and the population living there against another.

Country To Accept Portion of SFRY Debt

95BA0190C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 23 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Joze Biscak: "Slovenia Is Assuming the Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Minister Gaspari will sign an agreement with four members of the Paris Club on assuming the foreign debts of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], "worth" approximately $220 million.*

Ljubljana, 23 Feb—During the coming weeks, Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari will sign bilateral agreements with the governments of Germany and France, the Belgian Office National du Ducroie, and the Dutch insurance institution NCM [Nederlandsche Credietverzekering Maatschooppij] on assuming some of the foreign debts of the former SFRY. The agreements with the four members of the Paris Club, together with interest and the assumption of one-sixth of the Yugoslav clearing debt to the former East Germany, will be "worth" approximately $220 million.

A week ago the Slovene Government discussed and approved the final reports on the negotiations with delegations from France, Germany, and Belgium, and with the NCM, on concluding international bilateral treaties on repayment of the Slovene part of the debt to the members of the creditors in the Paris Club. The reports, which are also to be confirmed tomorrow by the parliamentary international relations committee, will be the starting points for signing a lot of agreements that are quite overdue. This is also discussed in a letter from the chairman of the Paris Club, Francis Mayer, which he sent to Minister Gaspari. It says that he is concerned because several bilateral agreements have not yet been signed. Also mentioned is the principle of the end user (allocated debt), according to which Slovenia's debt is to be specified, but, as Francis Mayer wrote, "that principle cannot apply in the event of a dispute," i.e., where there is no agreement between the contracting parties.

That was demonstrated in the negotiations with the Germans and Belgians in which the Ljubljanska Banka branch in Skopje was the guarantor (debtor) for the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] end user, Aluminin in Skopje, for $3.3 or $0.4 million. Both sides insisted that the amount should be included in the agreement. That was finally done, but the Macedonian end user's amount will not be included in the total debt that the Slovene side currently has to settle, but will instead be a subject of later agreements with the Paris Club. Thus, the agreement with the Belgians is to be "worth" $3.6 million ($2.9 million of which is allocated debt), the agreement with the Dutch $17.7 million ($15.5 million of which is allocated debt), and with France, with which five agreements will be necessary (a separate contract for each agreement that was concluded between the French Government and the former Yugoslav Government), $31 million ($29.4 million of which is allocated debt).

The Germans, who we will have to pay $163.8 million, dealt the worst blow to the Slovene negotiating delegation with their extortionist policy. The dispute arose because of 700 million German marks [DM], which was approved in 1974 as aid to the SFRY under an agreement between the former NBJ [National Bank of Yugoslavia] and the German KFW [Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau].

Documentation on the use of the loan ought to exist, because KFW was responsible for overseeing it. When the Slovene side wanted to check it, the Germans rejected that possibility, among other things, because "reviving the issue of how the funds were spent would cause difficulties for KFW and the German Government." The Slovene delegation insisted that it was allocated debt, and the Germans insisted that it was unallocated debt. "If the Slovene side does not accept the amount of 16.39 percent of the 1974 loan, which was also acknowledged within the framework of the Paris Club, then there is a danger that the regulation of Slovenia's debts will be impossible for the foreseeable future," the Germans threatened.

The Slovene Government agreed to it back in last July, and the State Assembly's international relations committee agreed with it in mid-December. Slovenia will thus overpay its debt to Germany by several tens of millions of German marks. That is not the only matter in which we have accommodated the Germans. Slovenia will also settle its share of the Yugoslav clearing debt to the former East Germany, even though the clearing claims and obligations have been included in the Geneva conference on Yugoslav succession. This involves 2.5 million in clearing (accounting) dollars, at a rate that is unfavorable for Slovenia: 0.75 clearing dollars per U.S. dollar (according to the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar in Frankfurt on 30 December 1990). Germany, in fact, does not want to lower the exchange rate, and at the same time it is making assumption of the clearing claims a condition for signing the agreement.

Otherwise, the total Slovene share of the debt to the members of the Paris Club (15 countries) is to amount to almost half a billion U.S. dollars. It is evident from the latest tabular summary that there is $219 million in allocated debt (the largest amount to the United States, $92 million), while the largest share constitutes $233 million in unallocated debt (the largest amount to Germany, $133 million, and $95 million to Kuwait, but this is only an estimate, because in the opinion of the Finance Ministry a compromise is possible). The share for which a Slovene bank was the guarantor (debtor) and the end user is from another republic amounts to $10.5 million, and the obligations transferred to the former NBJ (mostly under article 49 of the federal Law on Credit Relations With Foreign Countries) and Belgrade's Jugobanka are $15 million. Slovenia will also have to pay the latter, because Francis Mayer wrote in his letter to Minister Mitja Gaspari "that domestic regulations cannot be a basis for the replacement of debtors," that the creditors were not informed about the internal transfer of the obligations to the NBJ, and that the Paris Club members consider the original debtor responsible for the debt.

[Box, p 2]

The Paris Club members rejected Croatia's request for a 50-percent write-off of its share of the debt.

[Box, p 2]

Three agreements will be signed with Germany. An agreement with Nova LB is planned for the commercial part of the debt (allocated debt), an agreement between Slovenia and KFW for the debt from 1973 and 1974, and an umbrella agreement among countries, which will also include the clearing debt and a loan from 1956 (the Slovene share is DM39.34 million), will be signed for the total debt to the Paris Club.

Federal

Owen, Stoltenberg at News Conference in Belgrade

Owen Assesses Milosevic Talks

AU2303175395 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Mar 95

[Report by Tamara Motrenko on news conference by Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, in Belgrade on 23 March]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the two-hour talk with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Lord David Owen, chairman of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, expressed the following assessment of the meeting: We had very good and useful talks about the issues that represent serious problems in the region and the concern caused by the resumption of clashes in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Lord Owen's opinion, the resumption of clashes and the development of the field situation is extremely worrying, so it is very important that the signed New Year cease-fire be respected after April—that is, that it is extended through the summer. According to Owen, the best prerequisite for this is to start political negotiations as soon as possible. Lord Owen pointed out that there has been no dialogue between the warring sides since last July and that the most important priority is the establishment of political dialogue on the basis of the Contact Group plan.

Lord Owen explained that, according to him and cochairman Stoltenberg, the delay in negotiations is neither an acceptable nor satisfying solution and that the only solution is to resume negotiations and remove the possibilities of intensifying the war. Owen pointed out that it is wrong that in the last three years, we have gotten used to waging war and negotiating at the same time, which is bad and unacceptable. Such a development of the situation while clashes continue should not be allowed.

In reply to our question whether one will formally insist on extending the New Year cease-fire in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lord Owen said that, according to the international community, it would be best to extend the cease-fire along with resuming political dialogue and introducing constant work on the peace process.

We were told by Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UN envoy, that he has prepared a report for UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali on the future of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate and that consultations with both Knin and Zagreb have been under way with a view to finding a common denominator for a new UNPROFOR mandate. Stoltenberg hopes that a new basis that would satisfy both sides will be found, because if that is not done, a dramatic situation may ensue that could lead to the possibility of peace forces withdrawing and thereby enable the war to continue. Cochairman Thorvald Stoltenberg again pointed out that it is imperative that a common denominator be found for extending UNPROFOR mandate.

Owen on Situation in Bosnia

LD2303152695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1349 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—David Owen described said that today's talks between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia [David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg] were "good." He said that they discussed issues concerning the whole region and the war in Bosnia.

Asked to say more about the announced Russian plan for solving the Bosnian conflict and about the latest French initiative, Lord Owen said:

"I was in Paris yesterday and I was informed about the Russian and French initiatives. I think that progress has been made, although a lot of work remains to be done. It is too early to make any decisions or conclusions about the initiatives."

Lord Owen described the current situation in Bosnia as "very worrying." As he said, direct political talks are necessary in Bosnia because, Lord Owen recalled, we have not seen any of that since July last year.

Commenting on the initiatives for mutual recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, Lord Owen said:

"The issue of recognition is very complex and it has a certain impact on other issues too. As things stand now, this will be neither quick nor easy, but that is our final aim. The best way to achieve that is through dialogue."

Speaking again about the situation on the battlefields in Bosnia, Lord Owen said that "it is very worrying that the war is flaring up without dialogue."

"It is not good that over the past three years we got used to the fact that people are waging war and negotiating at the same time, but it is even worse if they do not negotiate at all," Lord Owen said.

His colleague Thorvald Stoltenberg said that he had compiled and sent a report to the UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali about the outcome of the talks he held with the representatives of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] and Croatia about the future UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate in the Serb Krajina protected zones.

Stoltenberg did not specify what he had written in the report on the basis of which Butrus-Ghali will write his report to be submitted to the Security Council. The

Security Council should pass a resolution on the mandate, name and number of peace troops in the RSK on the basis of Butrus-Ghali's report.

Five Opposition Parties Walk Out of Parliament

LD2303162795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1525 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—The heads of five opposition deputies' clubs in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly said at a news conference today that the assembly session, at which a confidence vote in the federal government was being debated, was over for them and that they would not take part in the confidence vote.

They explained they did this because the president of the chamber, Radoman Bozovic, did not allow Srdjan Darmanovic (SDP-CG) [Social Democratic Party of Montenegro] to take the floor on behalf of those who proposed the confidence vote for the second time at the end of the debate, while Prime Minister Radoje Kontic was allowed to do this.

Darmanovic specified that, in addition to his party's deputies, the deputies of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, the Serbian Radical Party, the Democratic Party, and the People's Party of Montenegro had walked out of the session.

"I offered the president of the chamber the choice: Either both I and the federal prime minister speak, or no one does," Darmanovic explained that the rules of procedure do not specify who can speak at the end of a debate, but that the common practice is that both sides have the right to a final speech.

Minal Komnenic (SPO) stressed that the walkout from the parliamentary session was forced on them, and that this could be the only response to Bozovic's behavior.

Representatives of the deputies' clubs voiced a series of complaints about the way in which the session was conducted, referring especially to frequent interruptions by the president of the chamber, the interruptions of the TV transmission, and the order in which the speakers appeared.

Kontic Reacts to Suspension of Assembly Session

LD2303201295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1629 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, addressing journalists after the suspension of today's session of the Yugoslav Assembly's Chamber of Citizens, said that he was surprised by the "intolerant conduct of opposition deputies." He added that in his opinion it was just an ugly scene which should be forgotten.

"I have been patiently listening to all deputies for three days," the federal prime minister said, adding that there were a great many insulting remarks, insinuations, false allegations and fabrications, and all this, he said, in the name of democracy and the freedom of thought and speech.

"When I wanted to deliver my closing speech in the name of this democracy and freedom of thought, and in the name of the federal government, this right was denied to me," Kontic said, referring to the chamber's code of practice, which permits members of the government to speak whenever they make such a request.

"I personally think that right from the beginning it was clear to the group which initiated the vote of confidence in the government that its request was not legally substantiated," the prime minister said, reiterating that the government decision was valid from the legal point of view, and that the entire controversy concerning BORBA has ended.

As for accusations about gagging the press, Kontic repeated the stand that NASA BORBA is still being printed, which best denies these accusations.

Kontic expressed the hope that the Chamber of Citizens will soon start to function normally and resume its work on legislation in the political and economic fields.

Second Operational Area Commander Tours Uzice

LD2403152295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1201 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Uzice, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—Lieutenant Colonel General Bozidar Babic, commander of the Second Operational Area of the Yugoslav Army [Druga armija Vojske Jugoslavije], and his aides toured the command and units of the Uzice Corps between 22-24 March. He observed the combat potential and readiness for carrying out planned tasks, a statement issued today by the Uzice Corps command says.

The statement says that Gen. Babic visited some plants of the special purpose factory and had meetings with local officials who informed him about defense preparations under their command.

Martic, Seselj Criticized by Belgrade Daily

AU2403120195 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Andjelka Popovic: "The Continuation of the Coup"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Radical Party meeting in Knin, "directed" by the Krajina war lobby and the self-appointed warlord Vojislav Seselj is, whatever else, a demonstration against peace and the interests of the Serbian people!

The political pamphlets and Seselj's speeches around Serbia, the republic of Serbian Krajina, and the former Bosnia-Herzegovina aimed at stirring up war and riots were unmasked a long time ago. However, it is incomprehensible that Milan Martic, the president of the republic of Serbian Krajina, is now asking for the help of somebody whom he until recently detested, at least in words.

It is clear to every political layman that Mr. Seselj and his "escorts" (Tomislav Nikolic and Acim Visnjic) arrived in Knin with the "blessing" of President Martic. They skillfully made use of the fact that soldiers and recruits were sworn in at the "Sjeverna" Barracks before 5,000 people the day before yesterday [18 March]. It is only natural that parents, mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, girlfriends, and relatives of soldiers were there. After leaving the barracks, many of them were "forced" to attend Seselj's meeting held 200 meters away.

Knowing that his "worn-out" ideas will not be accepted, and that he will have no audience, Seselj waited for the celebration to finish, so that the people, who had to pass by, could stop and listen to him for a while. In his speech he attacked as usual everything that might be reminiscent of peace.

Mr. Seselj and his sponsor from Knin, Mr. Milan Martic, the president of the Serbian republic of Krajina, tried to "spit" on the peace efforts made by the entire international community, on the peacemaking role of Serbia and its President Slobodan Milosevic, and as usual on Mrs. Mira Markovic, on the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, and on everyone else who supports peace.

The self-appointed warlord who had promised that Serbia would end in Karlobag and Virovitica and then simply "forgot" it, became all of a sudden fierce and heroic owing to his new "master."

The "directors" of Seselj's meeting hoped that his banality would help Milan Martic improve his shaken position of "the only defender of the Serbian nation in the republic of Serbian Krajina," and once again endanger Borislav Mikelic's position [of prime minister].

Martic himself seems to have forgotten that his coup staged in the latest session of the Krajina Assembly against Mikelic and the government of the republic of Serbian Krajina failed, and that the dream about his inviolable power burst like a soap bubble.

Instead of realizing this and submitting his personal ambitions to the interests of the people, Martic invited a man to help him whose warmongering policy leads to an abyss—Mr. Seselj, who lost the confidence of Radical Party members in Krajina too, because they did not approve of his policy and arrogance.

Today [20 March], Milan Martic should in Belgrade inform Mr. Akashi and President Milosevic, who supports peace and not war, on the official attitude of the republic of Serbian Krajina. How will he justify the meeting and the warmongering in Knin, which opposes the peacemaking efforts of the Krajina population?!

The Martic-Seselj duo, who drew up the itinerary for further Seselj speeches around Krajina, is probably trying now to (mis)use the suffering of the Krajina population for their own aims. They do not care for the fact that the interests of the people do not correspond to Martic's interests this time, let alone to Seselj's. Seselj has never cared for what people wanted, but now Martic has "disclosed" himself too.

Perhaps forever!

Serbia

Milosevic Receives U.S. Member of Contact Group

LD2303185095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1829 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Ambassador Robert Frasure, the U.S. representative in the Contact Group.

The talks focused on issues concerning progress in the peace process and the stepping up of the efforts aimed at eliminating the main causes which are prolonging the crisis and renewing the danger of an escalation of fresh clashes on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the office of the Serbian president has announced.

Belgrade Mayor on Lifting Sanctions, Peace Talks

LD2403105695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1037 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, March 24 (TANJUG)—The lifting of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia and peace talks among the warring sides in the former Yugoslavia are the way to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Belgrade Mayor Nebojsa Covic has said in New York.

Speaking at a panel discussion of correspondents from the United Nations on Thursday, Covic said that the sanctions were impeding and not enhancing the peace process, because they stimulated extremists on all sides, which led to the prolongation of war.

Covic said that Yugoslavia had been supporting all proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia from the very first day and that it would persist in this.

Covic said that since the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Belgrade had provided refuge for about 420,000 refugees, 323,000 of whom are Serbs, 38,000 Muslims, 11,000 Croats and about 40,000 people of other nationalities.

Such a large inflow of population has caused numerous humanitarian and other problems, including an increased number of criminal acts.

One of the objectives of the sanctions was to increase the rate of criminal acts, the Belgrade mayor said.

Within a 10-day tour of the United States, Covic has participated at the international conference on family in Salt Lake City and met with businessmen and Yugoslav emigrants in Los Angeles, Chicago and New York, whence he left for Washington.

Seselj Blames Milosevic, Wife for 'Tragedy'

LD2303192295 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1432 GMT 23 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Mar (BETA)—Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], said at a news conference today that he expects the war "in western Serbian lands" to escalate, and he welcomed the creation of the joint army of the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina.

Seselj also said that a group of SRS volunteers is currently fighting on Majevica, and that the party is ready to give any assistance to the Serb republic and republic of Serb Krajina army and people.

Seselj called on all honorable and honest members of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] to leave the party and thus preserve their honor and dignity.

Slobodan Milosevic has "brought about an enormous economic crisis and national tragedy, and under the influence of his wife he is quietly introducing a dictatorship."

"If the regime does not fall by the summer, Milosevic will introduce an open dictatorship," Seselj said, and added that the Serbian President is breaching the laws which he had introduced.

Seselj stressed that pressure on deputies and independent media are proof that the regime is dying, because "only insecure, suicidal and scared people use autocratic methods," Seselj said.

Kosovo

Rugova Protests Continued Serbian 'Repression'

AU2403104695 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 19 Mar 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Behxhet Haliti on news conference held by ethnic Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova in Pristina on 17 March: "Do Not Abandon Kosova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unfortunately, we always have to start news conferences by saying that the repressions by the Serbian police state in Kosova are continuing, because these are a stubborn reality. These news conferences are as monotonous as the situation in Kosova, but we must understand that politics means work, action, and reaction, and our reactions must be seen in this light. These were the opening words of Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, at Friday's regular news conference.

Systematic Repression Against the Albanians

The repression this week has been very extensive and systematic, Rugova then said. Ejup Kasumi from the village of Burrnik near Frizaj [Urosevac] was killed and we express our condolences to his family. He is the second victim of the Serbian police in Kosova this year.

Repression also continued in the form of raids on the homes of Albanian families on the pretext of looking for weapons. There were about 25 police raids in dozens of towns and villages of Kosova. This is a form of systematic repression against Albanian families, involving appalling violence and mistreatment.

For instance, Ajet Haxha's family in Mitrovice was raided three times, not to mention other occasions that we have not succeeded in recording.

President Rugova went on to say that repression against Albanian schools has also continued this week. The university teachers working on the premises of the Midjeni Primary School in Mitrovice were harrassed and arrested. There were also raids on the Hexeladin Deda Medical School in Mitrovice, the elementary school at Brabuniq near Mitrovice, and the Marin Bicikemi Secondary School in Vushtrri [Vucitrn], where the teacher Shemsedin Pllana was sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment, etc.

Violence against political activists, especially those of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK], is also continuing and has been accompanied by the maltreatment of members of presidiums, such as Ndue Balaj, chairman of the LDK subbranch at Kline, Nazmi Hashani, member of an LDK branch presidium, etc. The detention of the leaders of the PNDSh [Albanian National Democratic Party], who were imprisoned some months ago, has continued in Prizren; Emin Halimi, chairman of the Finance Council in Skenderaj [Srbica], was arrested and the forcible eviction of Albanians from their apartments has continued, as in the case of Miftaf Abazi in Rahovec, whose apartment has been given to a Serb. President Rugova went on to emphasize the violence used against Albanian journalists, as in the most drastic case of Cerkin Ibishi, our newspaper's correspondent in Mitrovic.

As part of this entire campaign of repression, Dr. Rugova mentioned the campaign for the call-up of young Albanian men and said that more than 230 call-up papers had been distributed in Malisheve alone.

There was also violence against charity workers last week. The doctors of the Mother Teresa Clinic in Decan were arrested, and this shows the scale of repression against all Albanian activists.

At the news conference, President Rugova called for the release of all Albanians who had been convicted and also dwelt on the Serbian campaign for the forcible colonization of Kosova. He said that building lots for Serbs have been announced at Ajvali near Prishtina, in Peje, and in other parts of Kosova. There have also been many cases of looting throughout Kosova this week, both by ordinary policemen and the so-called Finance Police. This is a campaign against what is supposedly the grey economy, but which is nothing of the sort because private businesses do not exist today.

The president also mentioned a very discriminatory law or decree that affects all citizens, but especially those of Kosova. This is the foreign currency law, which provides draconian punishments for the use of foreign currency. Rugova called on the police authorities, the police as individuals, and also on the Serbs of Kosova not to provoke their neighbors under these difficult circumstances, because we must all necessarily live together in Kosova.

At the news conference, President Rugova again appealed for an end to the repression and issued this appeal to the international community too. Kosova must have a greater international presence and must be put under international protection.

Kosova Remains an International Issue

President Rugova went on to say that Kosova had been at the center of international attention this week. The resolution on human rights in the former Yugoslavia that was approved in Geneva and which included very important points on Kosova has met with a very significant response. Kosova was also present in the forums of the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where we welcome the speech by Ms. Doris Pack, who denounced the violence and the dire situation, saw in Kosova a danger for the entire Balkans, and asked for a rapid and fair solution to the Kosova problem.

Dr. Rugova said that Kosova was also a topic at President Berisha's official meetings at the social summit of the United Nations in Copenhagen. We also welcome the visit of Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias to Tirana and hope that this will be a positive step toward good-neighborliness between Albania and Greece. As an EU member, Greece should be a factor of stability in the region.

President Rugova went on to welcome the very interesting and valuable analysis of the former U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, which dealt with the reasons for the destruction of Yugoslavia and especially the situation in Kosova, then and now.

We say once again that the best and fairest solution to the problem of Kosova, on the basis of the political will of the people, is an independent and neutral Kosova open to Albania and to Serbia.

Albanian Integration Need Not Scare Anyone

At yesterday's news conference, two or three journalists asked about the Serbian campaign for the call-up of young Albanian men, its consequences for the depopulation of Kosova, and the response by the government and political institutions of Kosova to this problem.

President Rugova said that we are responding on the basis of the conditions in which we find ourselves and the policies that we have determined. We stand firm in continuing our path of peace and our peaceful resistance and must continue with our contacts with the international public and international institutions. The other path, as we all know, is a very dangerous road, because Kosova and its people have been without any kind of protection for many years. We are therefore being reasonable and rational and this is our struggle and resistance, which has in spite of everything yielded results and has affirmed the cause of Kosova. Of course, Dr Rugova said, every movement and all resistance like ours involves great sacrifices.

Under our conditions here, we must remain in Kosova despite the violence, the sacrifices, and our victims, because we all know whom we help by leaving Kosova and whose plans this furthers. Our appeal not to abandon Kosova goes out to young men who are being called up for military service and to all categories of our citizens. We do not have the capacity to offer more than a minimal subsistence with humanitarian aid and with that Albanian solidarity that has been created in Kosova, which must include everybody. Minor discontents must not become a pretext for leaving Kosova. Our standpoint is that young people should not leave Kosova, and that Serbia does not in fact want Albanians in its army, because it is frightened of them, and Serbia's intention is for young people to turn their backs on Kosova.

Asked by a journalist to comment on the demands of the Serbian Resistance Movement in Kosova, Dr. Rugova replied that they do not surprise us. They are demands for the destruction of everything that is Albanian in Kosova. I call on the Serbian side, President Rugova said, and especially the Serbs in Kosova, to be reasonable and to look for opportunities for tolerance in order to contribute toward calming the situation.

Asked by another journalist whether the clashes in Turkey will influence the general stability in the Balkans, President Rugova said that first of all we hope that the situation there will soon be stabilized, because the conflicts are having an effect on Turkey itself, which is a major and important state in region.

Another journalist asked why Kosova had still not opened an office in Washington, considering that Gerry Adams [Sinn Fein leader] had opened a Washington office for his party in Northern Ireland, and that the U.S. Administration and Rugova himself had stated that there were no obstacles to opening such an office.

President Rugova said that we are working in this direction and an office for Kosova in Washington will be opened very soon. Fortunately, he said, the U.S. Administration has raised no obstacles on this matter. It is also worth mentioning here the U.S.'s interest in having an office in Kosova, Rugova said.

There were also two questions from journalists about the international pressures for the Albanians to surrender what is called their "maximum demands." There is talk of a "special status" and so forth.

Dr. Rugova said that there is talk of different alternatives today. The will of the people of Kosova for an independent and neutral state is now known. Pressures are part of the business of politics and they should be considered normal and not matters for alarm. Nothing can be solved overnight, as we have seen in the last five years and as we see today in our own region and elsewhere. All these things are a process. Our business is to work, organize ourselves, affirm our standpoints, and insist on their realization. Our standpoints are becoming increasingly clear to the international community. There is a strong legal basis and an international foundation for Kosova to become independent and to decide on its own destiny. I therefore do not find pressures of various kinds distressing or alarming.

Asked by journalists what Papoulias's visits to Tirana and Belgrade might mean for Kosova, President Rugova said that he did not believe that Papoulias's meetings in Belgrade included anything serious about Kosova.

Another journalist asked about the predictions of a confederation between Albania and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. President Rugova replied by saying that he thought it still early to talk about such confederations. We repeat our standpoint that a reorganization must take place that will enable everybody to remain in his own territory and to determine his own destiny. Integration in the Balkans and in Europe will be inevitable in the future. Albanian integration therefore need not scare anybody.

Interior Minister Denies Human Rights Abuses

AU2303220295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 23 Mar 95

[Interview with Federal Interior Minister Vukasin Jokanovic by Momcilo Boskovic; place and date not given; from the "Argument Vise" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Boskovic] Minister Jokanovic, how do you assess the political situation in Kosovo today? What is it like when the foreign press and the press in Albanian in Kosovo say that there is reign of terror there, that the regime is expelling and arresting Albanians, and the like? What do you say to this as you originally came from Kosovo, you visit there often, and you are acquainted with the situation?

[Jokanovic] Well, peace is ensured in Kosovo-Metohija, and the citizens' personal security and the security of their property are also ensured, as is their equality before the law. Kosovo-Metohija is, in every respect, being integrated into the Republic of Serbia as an inalienable part of it.

The internal affairs bodies have been taking measures envisaged by the law. In this respect, state bodies are performing their duties within the law and the Constitution. The measures envisaged by the law are also taken if members of the internal affairs bodies exceed their powers.

Regarding the assertions that can be found in the foreign press and that are particularly brewed in separatist kitchens, I can say that they are unfounded and are a part of the strategy of the Albanian separatist movement in Kosovo-Metohija, as it is well known that the basic goal of the internal affairs bodies is to ensure the full personal security and security of property of all citizens, regardless of their national affiliation. Therefore, the internal affairs bodies are also performing their duties according to the law and the Constitution.

This does not suit the secessionists as the scope of their activity is thus narrowed. They are, therefore, trying to continue to boycott official state institutions and to create some parallel bodies. However, this is successfully being stopped in Kosovo. Therefore, territorial pretensions against Serbia and Yugoslavia are being suppressed, and the separatists not allowed to realize their goal. Therefore, the only thing left to them is to call the conduct of the state bodies—which is in conformity with the law and constitution—a reign of terror, something that is then reported by some foreign newspapers.

[Boskovic] One can frequently read reports by the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and particularly by Tadeusz Mazowiecki [Special UN Human Rights rapporteur] to the effect that the situation in Kosovo is not as the world public expects it to be, that there is coercion there. Would you comment on this?

[Jokanovic] Regarding Mazowiecki's report, I can tell you that this report is untrue, that it lacks arguments, that it is full of untruths. That document is based on untrue and often invented facts that originate from the separatist circles in Kosovo-Metohija. Another source for the report is the Albanian separatist press that nevertheless comes out freely in Kosovo-Metohija. [passage ommited]

[Boskovic] Has Mazowiecki ever asked to be received by state bodies, either in Kosovo or here with you in the federation?

[Jokanovic] Well, I worked in Kosovo for a long time. I received numerous delegations and groups, many representatives of various international organizations, states, and parliaments, but as regards Mazowiecki and the likes of him, his sources are mainly one-sided, coming from the same brewery that possesses considerable material resources and that is well organized in propaganda activity, with a view to internationalizing the problems of Kosovo-Metohija.

[Boskovic] Let me ask you at the end what problems the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs is facing? You have been at the head of this ministry, so we would like to know what your greatest problems are and how you could work even better and more efficiently?

[Jokanovic] Well, you see, regarding the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, in suppressing violent and anticonstitutional actions by Albanian separatist during the 1981-93 period, it really contributed to the halting of their hostile activity.

However, one should keep in mind that, after the secession of the individual republic of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], the position and powers of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs have changed, so that the duties of security and maintaining public law and order on the territory of the Republic of Serbia and in Kosovo as its inseparable part, are in the jurisdiction of the Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, which means that Kosovo-Metohija is no longer the constitutive element of the federation it used to be, and the Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs is performing duties on that part of the territory of Serbia just like as on any other part of the territory. It is for this reason that the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs is no longer performing the duties it used to perform in Kosovo-Metohija. It is now performing duties according to the law. Its powers and duties will be established more precisely after new laws from the sphere of internal affairs are adopted.

[Boskovic] Thank you for this conversation.

[Jokanovic] Thank you.

Deputy Defense Minister, Commander Tour Kosovo

LD2403152695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1425 GMT 24 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—Deputy Federal Defense Minister Bogoljub Bjelica, and Lieutenant Colonel General Dusan Samardzic, commander of the Third Operational Area, toured Kosovo-Metohija over the past three days as part of their regular activities. During the tour they were informed about the state of defense preparations, the information service of the federal Defense Ministry announced today.

After reviewing the situation and holding talks with the most senior defense officials, Bjelica and Gen Samardzic concluded that very good results were achieved in carrying out important tasks, owing to the exceptional involvement of and cooperation between the Yugoslav army, the forces of the Interior Ministry, and the authorities.

Following a tour of the garrisons in Pristina, Prizren, Djakovica, Urosevac, and Gnjilane the deputy federal defense minister congratulated the soldiers and officers of the Pristina Corps on the results they achieved in the training and increasing combat readiness of military units, the statement says.

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